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iPREFACE
The TFX airplane has been the subject of endless investigation and 
•examination from its very inception. Although the amount of material 
concerning the TFX is substantial* in terms of governmental reports for 
the most partt there has been little research done on the topic from the
perspective of public administration and public management.
It is my intention to examine the TFX case from just such a perspec­
tive* beginning with its origins in 1961 and following through to its 
t e rminati on in 19 71 *
My analysis takes the form of a case study approach. However, I have 
tried to analyze the TFX in terms of its parts, rather than .chronologi­
cally* Consequently, each section of.this study should be viewed as a 
unit and not as a sequence in the history of the TFX. No attempt has been 
made to record every event in the history of the TFX. Rather, the empha­
sis has been on the significant factors relating to public administration 
and management.
The major source of information used in this study has been the four­
teen volumes that constitute the TFX Contract Investlgation made by the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation for the Committee on Government 
Operations of the U. S. Senate, in 1963 and again in 1970.
Several other sources of unpublished primary data were used and 
cannot be included in the appendices due to their bulk. These items, 
such as the letters, reports and memorandums between Comptroller General
ii
Staats and several congressmen, will be submitted for your review, subject 
to such a request.
It should be stated that interviews were conducted with several 
members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation and the Government 
Accounting Office - while requests for similar interviews were denied me 
by both the General Dynamics Corporation and the Department Of Defense.
I would like to express my appreciation for the understanding, assis­
tance and direction given me by Dr. James M. Roherty and Dr. Richard E. 
Brown of the Department of Government.
November 29 , 1971
ABSTRACT
The procurement of the'.TEX''weapons' system (E—111) has 
proven to be one of the most controversial development programs 
in the history of Department of Defense spending. The dev­
elopment of the TEX aircraft provides us with a novel example 
of weapons procurement. It is, in fact, the original use 
of the so-called 41 revolution1' in procurement policy as 
devised by Robert S. McNamara in his role as. Secretary of 
Defense.
In light of this, I attempt to show that the TEX program 
is a failure in that its end product, the E-lll airplane, 
is incapable of fulfilling the specifications and of per­
forming the missions for which it was intended. X attempt 
to show that it was not in keeping with Secretary McNamara1 s 
avowed policy of the best use of limited dollars, and resources. 
I also attempt to show that the failure of the TEX program 
is due, in part, to the civilian analyst’s inability to fit 
the complex requirements of a.major weapons system within 
the x^araiasters of their new management technique, and that 
these techniques directly challenged the role of the profess­
ional military officer by rejecting their expertise concerning 
weapons procurement.
My analysis takes the form of a case study approach. 
However, 1 have tried to analyze the TEX in terms of its. 
parts, rather than chronologically. Consequently, each 
section of this study should be viewed as a unit and not 
as a sequence in the history of the TEX. No attempt has 
been made to record every event in the history of the TEX. 
Rather, the emphasis has been on the significant factors, 
relating to public administration and management.
The available evidence enabled, me to draw several well- 
founded conclusions. One, there can be no doubt that the TEX 
was unable to meet the specifications and requirements for 
which it was. designed. Its size and weight severely affected 
its capability and maneuverability. Two, the program failed 
to produce the much vaunted $1 billion savings, for which it 
was intended. Three, there was a lack of cooperation between 
the civilian administrators in the Pentagon and their military 
advisers. Eour, part of the reason for the deterioration of 
relations between the civilian analysts and the military was 
the use of esoteric theories and arbitrary decisions by the 
civilian administrators. Eive, the utilization of the pro­
curement innovations of Mcommonality11 and 11 program definition 
phase1* by the civilian analyst proved to be ineffective in 
containing development costs. Six, the direct result of the 
TEX is the repudiation of the new management techniques of 
Robert McNamara and the return to the original procurement 




■Background History of TFX 
In 1959, General F.F. Everest, commander of the Tactical Air Command 
of the Air Force, drew up an outline for a new fighter aircraft. Based 
on concepts developed by the NASA Laboratory at Langley, Virginia, this 
new fighter would be the pristine application- of the variable^sweep wing. 
The Tactical Air Command wanted a plane that would replace the F«105 
tactical, fighter-bomber. Consequently, the new variable-sweep wing air­
craft ■would be required to perform- three' different'missions: (1) to gain 
air superiority in the battlefield, that is to say, it would require 
air-to-air combat ability; (2) to penetrate enemy defenses in order to 
interdict his supply caches and routes, this meant bombing and strafing 
behind the battlefield area; and (3) to provide close air support for the 
ground forces of the Army, this required air-to-ground combat ability.^
The new variable wing gave practical potential to these normally con­
flicting requirements.
By 19o0, the requirements for this new aircraft were resolved. On 
June 1 A, i960, the Air Force issued a Specific Operational Requirement 
specifying the minimum performance levels the new plane must achieve, and 
with it, the TFX - Tactical Fighter, Experimental - program was initiated. 
At the same time, the Navy was developing a new airplane for the 
purpose of fleet defense. This program, entitled the Missileer, was for
-2-
the development of a subsonic plane fashioned with a long-range missilef 
the Eagle.This new Navy aircraft was designed for subsonic "loitering** 
on an airborne patrol around the fleet. The long-range air-to-air £a- • 
gle missile was the real combat arm of the program. Its purpose was to 
seek and destroy enemy aircraft that might threaten the fleet. It was 
felt, however, that a fleet defense system based on a subsonic plane was 
a regression in the state of the art. Outgoing Secretary of Defense 
Thoms Gates discontinued funding for the Missileer project in December, 
I960 when he issued the directive that "he did not want to proceed with 
the development of a major weapons.system in view of the fact that there 
would be a change in administration."3
The Gates Directive was also applied to the Air Force TFX program. 
Thus* the Eisenhower administration * s reluctance to commit the in-coming 
administration to several new weapons systems forced the Air Force to 
postpone issuing its request to the aerodynamics industry for develop­
ment of the TFX. It also prevented the Navy from continuing its work on 
the Missileer system.
The new administration took office in January of 1961 , and Robert S. 
McNamara became the new Secretary of Defense. In the middle of February, 
1961, Secretary McNamara ordered all services to study development of a 
single tactical fighter based on the TFX proposal then under consideration 
by the Air Force.^  It should be noted that throughout the period 1959 to 
February, 1961, -the TFX project remained a single-service operation, that 
of the Air Force.
The period from February to December, 1961 saw the TFX program take 
on a totally new perspective. During that time, the TFX program was reor­
iented from a single-service piano to a biservice aircraft. Both the Navy
-3-
and the Air Force agreed that a single plane suitable to both services 
could be built - "provided that the other service would give up on its 
critical mission requirements. "-5
Consequently, Secretary of Defense McNamara on June 7, 19&1 ordered 
the Air Force and the Navy to prepare a single work statement based on 
the multi-mission approach of the TFX and within the criteria of the bi- 
service restrictions.
Thereafter,both the Air Force and the Navy performed additional studies 
pertaining to the new biservice TFX, as opposed to a separate plane for 
each service.
Concluding from these studies, each service recommended that it be 
permitted to develop its own separate aircraft to fulfill the extremely 
different missions of each.service *-^^Due to the problems of excessive 
weight and high cost of development, the Air Force and the Navy both a- 
greed that a compromised biservice TFX would be less than suitable for 
their purpose«
This exhortation was rejected by Mr. McNamara and on September 1, 1961, 
in a directive to both the Secretary of the Air Force and the Secretary 
of the Navy, Mr. McNamara stated:
I believe that the development of a single aircraft 
of genuine tactical utility to both services in the projected 
time frame is technically feasible...A single aircraft for 
both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air 
defense mission will be undertaken.7
This memorandum officially inaugurated the TFX program as a joint 
venture. It specified the technical parameters of weight and dimension 
which the services had failed to agree upon. Secretary McNamara also
ordered that "changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic 
aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum. ” 8
-h-
The above statement is the first elaboration of what was to become 
known as the concept of commonality.
The TFX Work Statement was sent to the aircraft industry on October 1, 
1961. The proposals of the various contractors were delivered to the 
Department of Defense on December 6, 1961.
Thereafter, the Air Force Systems Source Selection Board (here­
after referred to as SSSB) was given the proposals for review and evalu­
ation. After four evaluations covering the period from January 19* 1962 
to November 2, 1962, the military’s SSSB unanimously recommended that 
Boeing be selected as the primary source for the development of the TFX 
over General Dynamics, the only remaining competitor.
Then, on November 2-t, 1962, the Pentagon publicly announced the award 
of the TFX development contract to General Dynamics for 22 prototype planes 
at a cost of $^39 million. Robert S. McNamara, supported by the Secretaries, 
of the Navy and the Air Force, "overruled one colonel, four major generals, 
six lieutenant generals, five generals, five rear admirals, one admiral, 
and literally hundreds of lesser rank o f f i c e r s . ”9
The research and development contract with General Dynamics was signed 
by the Pentagon on December 21 ,1962, just a few hours after the Chairman 
of the Committee on Government Operations had requested a delay in the 
contract awarding subsequent to a review of the facts by the Committee.
Just one month later, February 26, 1963 * the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations for the Committee on Government Operations of the United • 
States Senate opened hearings on the TFX contract. The first series of 
hearings lasted from February 26, 1963 through November 20, 19o3« The 
hearings centered on who had the power and authority to decide who would 
manufacture tho aircraft and what type of plane it would be. The develop™
~ 5«
ment of one of the most controversial weapons systems in history also 
proved to be the longest congressional investigation ever. A second series 
of hearings were held some seven years after the initial investigation. 
Lasting from March 24 through April 28, 1970* this second group of hear­
ings centered on the performance capabilities of the TFX, then designated 
the F-111.
To date, the TFX or F-111 program is still functioning. Although 
greatly emasculated from the original concept, the Air Force has found 
it necessary to procure 51^ F-111 aircraft for use in its strategic bomber 
force. This is a sizable reduction from its initial quantity of 2^00.^^
The Pentagon issued a stop-work order on the F-111B on July 10, 1968 after 
the House Armed Services Committee along with the Senate Armed Services 
Committee refused budgetary authorization for the Navy version of the TFX.^ 
This was an historical first in that no other major weapons program had 
ever been terminated by Congress, over the objections of the civilians in 
charge of the Pentagon.
The costs for the TFX program have inflated considerably since its 
inception. In 19&3» the F-111 program was to be by far the largest pro­
curement contract ever let by the United States. It called for some 1,700
1 ?to 2,^00 planes at a total cost of $7 billion. Defense Department appro-
■Ok—  -
prelations for fiscal year 1972 now show that the present run of h-54- F-111
13aircraft has* cost' $7«9 billion. This seems a"long way from the promised 
$1 billion savings which the "commonality n between the Navy and Air Force 
was designed to achieve. 1 '^
The above history is but a brief recapping of significant develop­
ments in the ten year life of the TFX. It is not meant to be a complete 
history, but, rather, is meant to serve as an introduction and background for
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an in depth consideration of the more important factors involved in 
the TFX decision. These factors and the previously mentioned historical 
gaps shall be dealt with in other sections of this study. A complete 
chronology is included in Appendix #6.
Vforking Hypothesis 
As I have stated before, the procurement of the TFX weapons system 
has proven to be one of the most controversial development programs in the 
history of Department of Defense spending. This fact alone is ample 
reason to study the TFX program as an exemplary case of procurement de­
ficiencies. The development of the TFX aircraft, however, provides us 
with an even more novel example of weapons procurement. It is, in fact, 
the original use of the so-called ’'revolution” in procurement policy as 
devised by Robert S. McNamara in his i*ole as Secretary of Defense. J 
McNamara5s new management technique consisted of two major factors:
(1) a set of basic premises which set the intellectual 
stance of the McNamara group,
(2) management tools which’established the working 
methodology.^
The basic: premises of-the McNamara management technique can be des­
cribed rather effectively in terms of their function within the decision­
making process.^ First, the rational, function is the quantitative analy­
sis approach of cost effectiveness. ”It is the mechanism through which 
financial budgets, weapons programs, force -requirements-., ..military .strate­
gy and foreign policy objectives are all brought into balance with one 
another.Second, role definition is the process used to determine the 
distribution of political risks and establish political and administrative 
roles. For McNamara, this process was the 1953 amendments to the National 
Security Act which enabled him to reorganize "the entire Defense Estab­
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lishment /”"into7 a single approved plan....and permits the top manage­
ment of the Defense Department.••.to focus their attention on the tasks 
' and-mission's related to our national objectives, rather than on the tasks 
and missions of a particular s e r v i c e . T h i s  unification of objectives 
and definition of role centralized authority in the Department of De­
fense in the hands of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Secretary of Defense,2  ^Third, the legal function is the process by which 
decisions are given a presumption of legitimacy. For McNamara, this pre­
sumption came less as an appeal to military authority and expertise to 
legitimize policies, and more as an application of personal philosophy:
either of two philosophies of management could be 
followed by a Secretary of Defense. He could play 
an essentially passive role-a judicial role. In 
this role the Secretary would make decisions re­
quired of him by law by approving recommendations 
made to him.
On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense 
could .play an active role providing aggressive 
leadership - questioning, suggesting alternatives, 
proposing objectives, and stimulating progress.
This active role represents ray own philosophy of 
management.2 ^
The basic premises of the group of McNamara civilian analysts were 
the superstructure upon which all Pentagon decision-making was grounded. 
The management tools were the "planning-programming and budgeting sys­
tems and the cost-effectiveness studies of systems analysis"22 which 
were utilized to accomplish the overall objectives of McNamara's policy, 
which was "choosing strategies and weapons systems.. how best to 
use our limited, dollars and limited resources. ”2^
The introduction of this new management technique, into procurement 
policy.was a radical departure from the established system of service 
division of the military budget and competition through prototype de-
-8-
velopment.
In the TFX case, we have our first glimpse of the previously mentioned 
basic premises of the new civilian analysts in the Pentagon. At the same 
time, the TFX program provides us with only a partial example of the new 
management tools. Planning-programming and budgeting was not used at all 
in the developmental stage of the TFX. Cost realism, commonality and 
program definition phase were the innovating techniques used to analyze 
the TFX p r o j e c t . The controversy over the TFX arose from the applica­
tion of these new management approaches and the changes they wrought 
in the traditional relationship between the civilian and military sectors 
of the Defense Department. It is a case history of "how the civilians in 
the Pentagon gained operating control, over the Military.
The fact that a significant change in civilian-military relations 
occurred during this time of innovative management is quite important. 
Equally notable is the result that such a change in procedure effects in 
the goods produced. In light of this,''I shall attempt to show that the 
TFX program is a failure in that its end product, the F-111 airplane, is 
incapable of fulfilling the specifications and of performing the missions 
for which it was intended. That is to say, it was. not. in keeping with 
Secretary.McNamarafs avowed policy of the best, use of limited dollars 
and resources. I shall also attempt to show that the failure of the TFX 
program Is due, in part, to the civilian analyst's inability to fit the 
complex requirements of a major weapons system within the parameters of 
their new management technique, and that these techniques directly chal­
lenged the role of the professional military officer by rejecting their 
expertise concerning weapons procurement.
-9-
Asgumptions
Before beginning an analysis of my hypothesis, I would like to posit 
two basic assumptions:
(1) That within the bounds of any hypothesis there are two types 
of variables: (a) endogenous and (b.) e x o g e n o u s . 26
(2) That the endogenous variables can be examined, studied and some­
times measured and then related to the hypothesis for possible 
acceptance or rejection of that thesis.
That the exogenous variables, while they may affect the hypo­
thesis do not lend themselves to measurement and thus, cannot 
be applied to the hypothesis for acceptance or rejection.
Along with these two assumptions, two facts pertaining to this study 
must be noted;
(1) Due to the lack of cooperation from the General Dynamics 
Corporation, the information available concerning the relation­
ship of General .Dynamics with, the then Secretary of the Navy 
North and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric is 
highly selective. As a result, the use of this information
may reflect a bias against the activities of the above mentioned 
firm and their relationship with Messrs. North and Gilpatric, 
Although the record shows a, potential conflict of interest on 
Secretary North's part,‘.and an actual conflict of interest on 
Mr. Gilpatric's part, it is hard to measure and assess their 
interest and influence in the TFX decision. ^
(2 ) The exact nature and extent of Presidential, and Vice-Presiden­
tial influence in the TFX decision-making process has never 
been fully disclosed. Indeed, the fact that the TFX program
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had many political implications cannot be denied.^ With re­
gard to this particular case, Mr. McNamara has never spoken out 
on the President's role in the TFX. As one commentator noted, 
"only two men ever really know the answer to that, and one of
them is dead."29 Thus, it seems that at this point in history
it is impossible to truly measure the role that Presidential 
political, influence playedon the TFX decision.
The,purpose of this study is to examine the TFX case from, a public 
administration-public management point of view. The areas I will examine 
will be concerned chiefly with the administrative and management issues, 
of civilian-mi1itary relations and procurement policy. The endogenous f 
factors will' be: configuration, cost overrun, contract selection, civil­
ian-military relations, commonality, and non-prototype competition.
The exogenous variables* conflict of interest and political., iftflu- 
ence in the decision-making process, will also be dealt with in the • 
context of this study. However,.it should be noted that the conclusions
of this study are only as valid as the measurable effects of the Varia­
bles considered. In the case of the exogenous factors, the conclusions
are limited by the incomplete nature of the material available for 
analysis.
Outline of the Study 
In order to examine my hypothesis, I have constructed a series 
of questions related to the variables to be considered.
Has the TFX met its original performance goalsf, and have costs for 
the program been excessive? are both examined with regal’d to the config­
uration of the aircraft and cost overruns. How was the TFX contract
-11-
awarded?, and were the military pleased with the award system? will be 
considered with relation to the variables of the contract selection pro­
cess and civilian-military relations. How useful has the TFX plane been 
to the services?, and what will be the rules for future development 
contracts? are discussed in an analysis of commonality and non-proto­
type competition.
In order to answer these questions, I will.look at the issue of the 
failure of the TFX program in terms of configuration and cost overruns 
in Chapter II of this study. In Chapter III, I will analyze civilian 
management of the military in light of the special problems of contract 
selection and'civilian-military relations. Finally, in Chapter IV, I 
shall'discuss the problem of the procurement innovations of the civilian 
analyst, that is, commonality and. non-prototype competition. The question 
of who is ultimately responsible for the TFX failure will be taken up in 
Chapter V, the conclusion.
-12-
CHAPTER II. THE FAILURE OF THE TFX PROGRAM 
CONFIGURATION 
Original Concept
On October 1, 1961, the United States Air Force Issued a work state­
ment to the aerodynamics industry requesting bid proposals for a new 
fighter plane. The Defense Departmentes "want ad1* for a new aircraft in­
dicated that the TFX - tactical fighter, experimental - should be:
A single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical 
mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission...Changes 
to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft 
to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum.^
The description in the work statement was a radically different 
approach in military aircraft design and purpose. Normally, militarjr 
aircraft are designed as single-purpose airplanes, each plane intended 
to perform a specific function or mission within the limits of its de­
signed role.
Fighter aircraft were designed to climb and maneuver rapidly. To 
accomplish this mission, they were forced to limit their payload and fuel 
capacity and thus shorten their range. Strategic bombers were designed to 
carry heavy ordnance over long distances at high altitudes. Unfortunately, 
strategic bombers prove to be quite cumbersome in air-to-air and air-to- 
ground combat* They were also found to be unable to penetrate distant 
targets at a low altitude and lacked the speed to evade enemy radar at 
such a low level.
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Consequently, each type of aircraft required its own separate back­
up of ground support equipment and personnel, spare parts and aircrew 
training. All of this tends to be quite large and rather expensive.
With the issuance of the October 1 , 1961 work statement, the TFX 
would become the first aircraft built specifically to reverse this his­
toric trend toward specialization. Utilizing a NASA Laboratory break­
through in aerodynamic design, "the variable-sweep wingH,^  the TFX would 
be a new step forward in aircraft versatility. By incorporating this. . 
major advance in airframe construction with the advanced technology of 
fan afterburning engines, the TFX promised to be aerodynamically efficient 
for short takeoff and landing, supersonic dash or long-range cruise from 
the slowest to the fastest operating speeds.
Performance Specifications 
Specific performance qualifications were included in the work state­
ment. Not only would it have the new variable-geometry which would fold 
the wings back along the fuselage for high-speed flight:,] but it would 
also be required to perform either nuclear or conventional bombing missions 
against well-defended targets in any type of weather, day or night; launch 
air-to-ground missile or rocket attacks with a variety of weapons; ground- 
strafe or attack aircraft in the air.with;2O-millimeter cannon fire; per­
form low or high-level reconnaissance missions against defended targets; 
take off or land on sod fields; fly supersonically at sea level and. fly 
transoceanic distances on internal fuel only, and thousands of miles fur­
ther with external fuel tanks.3
The TFX had to perform these missions within the parameters of the 
Air Force's specific performance requirements:**
- 14-
(1) Takeoff weight.......................69» 122 lbs.
(2) Maximum Speed, high altitude.............2.5 mach
(3) Maximum Speed, sea level.............. 1.2 mach
(4) Cruise Speed, high altitude..........2.2 mach
(5) Combat Ceiling...................... ..62, 300 ft.
(6) Acceleration time, M=.9 to M=2.2..... ...1.45 min.
(7) Takeoff distance...................   ,2,780 ft.
(8) Landing distance........   2,250 ft.
(9) Supersonic dash distance........... 210 miles
(10)Ferry range,.............................4,180 miles
The flight envelope of the TFX - a plotted graph showing all of the 
above speeds and. altitudes - would by far exceed that of any other U. S. 
aircraft ever produced since It would combine the capabilities of both 
high and low-speed aircraft.
The development contract for this unique and novel airplane was let 
to the General Dynamics Corporation in late December, 1962 amid unprece­
dented controversy.- This issue, however, will be covered more thoroughly 
in another section of this study.
Performance Realisations 
General Dynamics began work on the TFX, officially designated F-111 
^hereafter used interchangeably), as soon as the contract was announced. 
The refinement of design ideas contained in the TFX. work proposal pro­
ceeded for. over two years before the first F-111 was finally constructed. 
On October 16, 1964, the first F-111 was unveiled at the General Dynamics 
plant ifc Fort Worth, Texas.
The new airplane was immense for a fighter, over 73 feet in length - 
equal to that of a B~1 ? bomber.3 It had a wing span of 63 feet when fully- 
extended and stood 1? feet high. See Appendix #1 for full configuration 
design. Outfitted with the latest developments in aerodynamic knowledge, 
the F-111 was to be the mainstay of the U. S. airpower through the 19?0*s. 
It contained the new variabla-sweep wing which, In effect, enabled the
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pilot to redesign his aircraft while in flight. Extending the wing in­
creased the surface area of the plane for maximum lift, enabling short 
takeoffs and landings. The surface area was reduced by sweeping the 
wings back against the fusilage, increasing speed to allow for super­
sonic flight.
The twin turbofan engines were to provide low fuel consumption for 
long-range subsonic flight, while their afterburners would offer more 
thrust for takeoff ' and supersonic speed. The landing gear was designed 
to permit high speed landings on sod or dirt airfields. The forward door 
of the main landing gear also served as an aerodynamic speed brake.
The flight control system was completely self-adaptive, automati­
cally adjusting for deviations in the flight path. The crew module of 
the F-111 was designed as a self-contained, independent vehicle within 
the aircrafto If the crew is forced to abandon the airplane, an explo­
sive cutting cord shears the cockpit module from the fusilage, a rocket 
motor ejects it upward and it then can. descend to the ground or sea by 
parachute where it would serve as a survival shelter.
No doubt the most outstanding feature of the newly unveiled TFX 
was its "radar navigation systems"6 or avionics. The avionics sys­
tems provide the capability for communications, navigations, terrain 
following, target acquisition and attack, penetration of enemy defenses 
and safe return of the aircraft.
The Mark I avionics system of the F-111. was the most advanced ana­
log computer-controlled navigation system ever built. The avionics sys­
tem was actually composed of five major subsystems: (1) a navigation and 
attack set to provide navigation and guidance data; (2 ) an attack radar 
set to give high resolution pictures.of the ground or air-borne targets;
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(3) terrain-following radar (TFR) enabling the crex^  to fly the plane au­
tomatically at a selected low-level clearance above the ground for con­
cealment from enemy radar; (4) a low altitude altimeter set to feed 
information to the TFR on the plane's altitude at any given moment; (5) 
a lead computing optical sight set and missile launch computer to allow 
the aircrew to fire guns and missiles precisely by using data shown on 
a transparent optical display in the crew module * 7
The airframe and wing carry-through section of the F-111 was composed 
of steel and aluminum in an effort at maintaining simplicity of materials 
and lower costs.®
The F-111 made its first test flight on December 22, 1964. Since 
then it has logged over 52,000 hours of flight time.9 ^  analysis of the 
aircraft6s actual performance record between December, 1964 and October, 
1969 indicates that the plane "does not meet initial contract specifica­
tions in basic weight, takeoff and landing distance, ferry range, combat 
ceiling, maximum speed and supersonic dash range on the deck"*^ - other­
wise referred-to as low level flight.
The work statement and contract specifications call for a maximum 
takeoff weight for the TFX at a little more than 6 9,000 lbs. The actual 
takeoff weight has turned out to be approximately 13*500 pounds more thap 
specifications« That is a deficiency in performance of 20$. Since this 
weight affects takeoff distance, the present distance required for take­
off is 3,550 feet or 28$ more than the specification of 2,780 feet. Con­
comitantly, the landing distance is 3$ over the requirement at 2,320 feet 
instead of 2,-250 feet.H
The contract spelled out an unrefueled ferry range without external 
tanks of fuel of 4,180 miles, The F-111 is capable of only 2,750 miles,
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about 34$ short of the contract goal. The combat ceiling of the aircraft 
is 58,000 feet. Compared to the specification of 62, 300 feet, that is 
a deficiency of 7$«^
Although the airplane has been able to meet the specifications of
maximum sustained speed at high altitude of 2.2 mach and a sustained speed
at sea level of 1.2 mach, its supersonic dash distance capability is only 
■thirty-'miles. The contract called for a supersonic dash distance of 210 
miles* that is an 85$ loss of performance. The most egregious deficiency 
in the F-111*s performance capability is its acceleration time from 
mach .9 to m o b  2.2. The contract required an acceleration time of 1.45 
minutes, the actual performance figure is four minutes or 275$ over the
requirement. 3^ A complete chart of specified performance versus actual
performance can be found in Appendix #2.
It,is quite clear that the TFX aircraft produced by General Dynamics 
Corporation has been unable to fulfill the specifications required of it. 
An examination of the production changes and modifications between 1964 
and 1969 sheds some light on this particular problem of the F-111.
Changes and Modifications
In a statement before the Senate Subommittee on Appropriations in
1969 and.reprinted in the 1970 TFX Hearings (Vol. 1, p. 169), Lt. Gen.
John VI O'Neill, Vice Commander, Air Force Systems Command stated that he:
would like to review for you /j”the Subcommittee/ 
now the significant development problems in this 
program... These are:
1. The weight growth of the basic airframe;
2. The engine air inlet problem;
3- Other engine problems;
4. The flight control system actuator 
valve weldment failure;
5. The wing carry through structure fatigue 
test failures.
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It is interesting to juxtapose Gen. O’Neill’s list of the signifi- 
cant development problems with Secretary of Defense McNamara’s enumer­
ation of the reasons why the General Dynamics*proposal was technically 
superior to the Boeing Corporation submitted design. In a statement 
prepared for the 19&3 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearings 
into the TFX contract and read by Department of Defense General Counsel 
J.T. MeNaughton, Secretary of Defense McNamara stated:
There were three aspects of the Boeing proposal 
which, on their face, complicated the development of 
the aircraft.: Three problems in particular stood out 
in my mind. The first problem was Boeing *s_proposed 
use of engine thrust reversers...to date /March 13* 19&3”/ 
engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight 
on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever 
been employed on supersonic aircraft...The second area 
which...seemed likely to produce more complicated 
development problems was its proposed powerplant in­
stallation with top-mounted Inlets...location of the 
inlets on top of the fuselage...results in significant 
distortion of the airflow at the engine face under most 
conditions'. • .The third area which.. «involved greater 
development risks was its extensive use of titanium in 
its wing carry-through structure...it was not advisable 
to use titanium...because of a lack of data relating 
to such use...I realized that riot only would the oper­
ational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but 
additional costs would be incurred. ^
As a result of considering Boeing’s proposal which included the 
above mentioned potential problem areas and General Dynamics* proposal 
which was less "exotic"^5, Mr. McNamara selected the proposal of General 
Dynamics "which seems likely to involve less change with consequent de­
lays and Increased costs.
By reexamining General O ’Neill’s list of significant development 
problems and Secretary McNamara * s list of potential development prob­
lems in the Boeing design, we can see that Mr. McNamara was quite skilled 
In anticipating future design problems. Of course, this fact is known
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only because the General Dynamics design encountered the problems which 
were used as the basis for eliminating the Boeing proposal.
Since the "more straightforward design of General Dynamics? ran 
into development problems, it is hard to assess what the results of the 
more advanced Boeing design would have had on the development of the TFX 
aircraft. However, with regard to the General Dynamics and Boeing propo­
sals f some facts are available. Concerning the General Dynamics design:
(1) There have been approximately 3 9 900 changes;
(2 ) The program has slipped behind schedule by four years;
(3) The program production schedule has been cut by 40$,; 
from 2,000 planes to about.500;
(4) The program cost has risen from an estimated initial 
outlay of $5«5 billion for 1,388 planes, to a cost 
of $7,466 for 54? planes.^”
In addition, tests performed by the Langley Research Center as early 
as June of 1963, indicated that the General Dynamics TFX would need to
be redesigned because:
(1) The F-111 design would not meet the Air Force speci­
fications for the primary mission dash requirement.
(2) The airplane would not develop the maneuver capability 
at supersonic speeds specified by the contractor.
(3) Its directional stability was extremely low at super­
sonic speeds.^
The findings of the Langley Research Center questioned the perform 
mance capability of the TFX in its multimission role. Its primary mission 
was to be that of a strategic fighter, with a bombing capacity as well.
In an exchange between Senator Henry Jackson and Air Force. Secretary 
Zuckert in 1963s Zuckert defended the TFX®s fighter predominance:
Jackson:...Wouldn’t it be better to call it a fighter- 
bomber, rather than just a fighter?
Zuckert: You can call it anything you want, Senator, 
and these are a question-of. degree. But 
this is because of its speed, altitude, 
maneuverability, and other things, it 
is more like a fighter than it is like 
a bomber.
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Jackson: It is predominantly a fighter, you would 
say?
Zuckert: I have always thought of it as a fighter, 
because of its maneuverability...and 
because it can engage in aerial combat 
in a fashion that a bomber can’t engage
, in. aerial-..combat.20. _.
In the 1970 TFX Contract Investigation hearings Lt. General O’Neill,
when asked by Senator Gurney and Senator McClellan to define the mission
for which the F-111 would be utilized, stated:
O’Neill: We intend to utilize the F-111 prineiply 
as a deep interdiction strike aircraft.
By that I mean to deliver bombs, either 
conventional or nuclear, on enemy targets 
which are deep behind the battleline.
McClellan: ...We would be told it was a fighter 
and then we would be told it was some­
thing else.
Now we have whatever we have, and it 
is not a fighter plane, is it?
O’Neill: It is not an air superiority fighter air­
craft.^
The Chief of Staff for the United States Air Force, General John 
I). Ryan, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations 
hearings for the Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972, cited 
that the F-111:
is the finest airplane in the world for bad weather,
night interdiction m i s s i o n s . 22
General Ryan also stated that there was a "need for an air superior­
ity fighter."23
Although there appears to be some disagreement on just exactly what 
the mission role and design capabilities of the F-111 are, there is one 
self-evident fact, as Vice Admiral T.F. Connally, Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations, pointed out:
Wo sit here and discuss all the things wrong 
with the F-111. There are some things that the F-111 
can do. It can fly...It won’t serve the pilot’s needs
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like it should, and it ought to be fixed properly, 
but it still can fly*..
The Langley Research team recommended redesigning the TFX in order 
to improve on its maneuverability and speed. Yet, there appear to be a 
number of other problem areas that call for a redesigning of the General 
Dynamics F-111.
General James Ferguson, Commander of the Air Force Systems Command,
in a prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
1970, testified that not only did the F-111 have a weight problem but that:
another development problem involved matching of 
the aircraft engine and its air inlet...the F-111 *s 
inlets have been redesigned to accommodate the air 
flow requirements of the advanced engine design.2^
Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, while giving testi­
mony before the same Armed Services Committee, noted that metal fatigue 
on the F-111 was due to structural flaws because ’’high strength materials, 
be they aluminum or steel, have a characteristic that they rip like 
cloth under certain circumstances.h2^
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul H« Nitze, before the Senate Sub­
committee on Appropriations in July, 196? when questioned by Senator 
John McClellan concerning the adequateness of the F-111*s present air 
brake, replied:
The original, speed brake design caused moderate 
to severe buffet at high speed..,It is anticipated 
that the redesigned speed brake now'being tested will 
be operable throughout the flight envelope with an 
acceptable level of buffet.'''
I have documented the fact that the General Dynamics design was found 
to be deficient as far back as 19&3* Unfortunately, nothing was done to 
correct those problems as they arose. By deployment, time in 1967, three 
serious problems had arisen. First, the use of steel and aluminum in the
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airframe .had'caused an increase in weight as well as structural flaws. 
Second, the air inlets or air scoops needed to be redesigned to assure 
maximum efficiency. Third, the use of the forward door of the main land­
ing gear as a speed brake was ineffective and had also to be redesigned. 
All of these factors led Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval 
Operations to observe:
we don*t have an optimum p l a n e .
At the same time, there'are several facts concerning the Boeing 
proposal that should be examined. As I have stated before, three of the 
principal reasons for Secretary of Defense McNamara1s rejection of the 
Boeing proposal were the use of titanium in the air frame, the use of 
overhead air inlets, and the use of thrust reversers rather than speed- 
brakes to slow the aircraft down. All three were considered to be novel 
applications of new technology to a fighter aircraft and, therefore, would 
require more costly study and development, or, at least, that is what 
Mr. McNamara testified.
In point of fact, the TFX work statement actually encouraged the use
of titanium in the design proposals in order to conserve weight:
Materials and components: The design and operational 
objectives stated in this work statement support the 
conclusion that the.../ TFX/ air vehicle and subsystems 
can be successfully produced from readily available 
and economical-to-use raw materials...However, special 
consideration shall be given to the use of titanium 
with a view toward reducing weight of the aircraft.29
Aviation Meek and Space Technology magazine in 1964 stated that, “in­
dustry sources report at least 4,000 pounds of titanium will go into 
each Genera3, Dynamics F-111* The amount is expected to continue to climb 
to reduce the weight problem in both the Air Force and Navy versions."30
This same issue carried an article discussing the merits and
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capabilities of a then super-secret aircraft, the Lockheed A-11. The 
article pointed out that the A-11 is a Mach 3»5 long-range aircraft, 
whose mission altitude exceeds 100,000 feet and whose range is in ex­
cess of 4,000 .miles.. Developed, by the Lockheed Corporation as a recon­
naissance plane, it was then being used as an interceptor. It was mainly 
composed of titanium. It also was powered by two turbojets with after­
burners and'thrust reversers. It had been under development since 1959.3^ 
Senator McClellan stated during the TFX hearings that contrary to 
Mr. McNamara#s assertion, titanium was a proven metal since the Air 
Force had developed and was purchasing planes that had 95% of their 
weight in titanium.32 On February 19, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
commented on the A-11:
i One of the most important technological achieve­
ments in this project has been the mastery of the 
metallurgy and fabrication of titanium metal which 
is required for.aircraft travelling at more than 
three tiroes the speed of sound.33
'The use by Boeing of thrust reversers and the location of the air 
inlets were also questioned as doubtful techno3.ogical achievements. How­
ever, the Air Force’s most advanced high-speed aircraft, the A-11, em­
ployed thrust reversers as its brake system. In fact, as the testimony 
of Boeing’s Vice President noted, “our new model ?2? short-range jet 
transport, with three engines of the same type and some 20% larger than 
the engine proposed for the TFX. .lias a thrust reverser essentially 
identical in detail design to that proposed for the Boeing TFX.“34 
Mr. Edward C. Wells, Boeing’s Vice President, also noted that:
The top-mounted engine inlets are another design 
feature which has been questioned with regard to techni­
cal risk....the only question seems to be whether or 
not it will work. The answer is an unqualified "Yes'8.
The model ?27 airplane is currently flying with a
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top-mounted engine inlet which has already proven 
completely satisfactory over a wide range of speed 
and angle of attack.35
Disregarding the advice and admonitions of various groups of experts, 
and despite the inability of the TFX to meet its original expectations, 
the multimission concept was expanded even further than originally planned. 
A whole family of F-111 airplane types were begun, to include not only 
the Air Force F-111A and The Navy's -'F-1t1B,. but also an RF-111A recon­
naissance plane, an FB-111 strategic bomber, an F-111G for the Australian 
Army and the F-11iK for use by the United Kingdom, as well as several 
modifications on the F-111A version which were designated F-111D, F-111E 
and F-111F« A complete rundown of each aircraft can be found in Appendix 
#3.
Having examined the configuration and performance goals of the TFX 
aircraft, I will now turn to the cost goals of the TFX program.
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COST GOALS AND COST.OVERRUNS
Original Program Costs 
In December of 1962, the press made known to the United States 
public the fact that a contract between General Dynamics and the 
United States Air Force had been signed. In their account of this 
particular transaction, several facts were revealed. According to the 
published reports, General Dynamics was to build 22 prototype airplanes 
at a cost of $750 million. It was also revealed that the expected pro­
duction run of the aircraft would total 1,500 planes over the next, five 
years at a total cost of approximately $5 billion, or $2.9 million a 
plane.. Defense Secretary McNamara was. reported - to have felt that it would 
cost $1 billion less to develop a basic plane for both military services 
rather than a different plane for each b r a n c h . 36
%  November, 1963* when the Contract Definition Plan was officially 
announced, the total number of aircraft to be constructed had risen from 
22 to 1,370. The estimated cost of this project was put at $5-5 billion. 
This estimate represented the cost of 1,370 F-111A tactical fighters 
for the Air Force, 18 Research and Development aircraft and common re­
search and development for both the Air Force and the Navy version of the 
airplane. The unit price for the new TFX was then established at $3.96 
million a. plane. 37
A subsequent proposal to increase the number of F-111 aircraft to 
1,72.6, allowing for the Navy's 300 planes, brought the total cost of the
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program to $5,803 million, and pushed the unit price up to $4.1 million 
respectively.3^ paring the ten year history of the TFX program estxmated 
orders for the number of aircraft to be produced escalated to as many as 
2,411. Unfortunately, the Air Force did not submit an estimate of cost 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the 2,411 order.39 Conse­
quently, there is no way of determining the total cost for the proposed 
full-..complement of aircraft and we are, perforce, left to deal with the 
documented figures of $5*.803 million for 1,726 planes at a unit cost of 
$4.1 million.
Development Overruns 
The initial research and development contract covered research 
and development, testing, evaluation, and the production of 18 F-111A 
airplanes and 5 F-111B planes and included static and fatigue testing 
on these airplanes. Provisions were included which allowed for the 
ordering of training devices and spare parts which were to be priced 
at a later date than the December 21, 1962 signing of this contract.
The initial target costs for this first research and development 
contract called for the development of the F-111A at a cost of
$290,390,500® The manufacture of 18 F-111A planes was estimated at
$11?s4?7s000 and 5 F-111B planes at $33,132,500. A target profit of 
$39*375*000 was included, to bring the total cost of the initial re­
search and development contract to $480,375* 000.^
The actual definitive contract was not signed until August 31,1969 
some six years later. This research and development contract had been 
expanded, to include the development of the entire family of F-111 air­
craft, the RF-111, F-111C, F«111K, F-111D, FB-111 strategic bomber and
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the advanced F-111S airplane. This increased the target cost by some 
$324.5 million for development. Dae to changes in the F-111A test air­
craft the target cost of the aircraft themselves had inflated by 
$14.1 million. There was an increase in cost due to the aforemen­
tioned provisions for training devices and spare parts which totaled 
an additional $166.5 million. A concomitant increase in the allowed 
profit brought that figure to $77,847»2?4. As a result, the total net 
increase in target cost was $51 '1 -4 million, which brought the total
if,]
definitive costs to a grand total of $992- million as of August^1969.
By December 31* 1969, General Dynamics had re-estimated its definitive 
costs for development to $1,718 million. Additional costs for engines 
were also included, so that by March of 1970 the total cost of the re­
search and development contract was complete at $2,160 million, some
42
$1,680 million above the original target cost of $480,375*000.
Production Overruns
The initial production contract covered only 493 aircraft over a
four year program from 1965 through 1968. On the original contract, 469
of the planes were priced as F-111A * s and 24 were priced as F-111B*s.
The initial target costs for this contract called for $1,671,503,267
for total costs plus a target profit of $150,435,294, bringing the
43entire price of the first production contract to $1,821,938,561«
Daring its inception there were a number of model and program 
changes which forced an extension of the contract to include six fiscal 
years, 1965 through 1970. These increases due to changes in the basic 
aircraft design, including the introduction of the other F-111 type 
airplane, e.g. FB-111, F-111, C, D and S series, plus training devices
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and spare parts increased the costs to $2 ,375*300,000 including an
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updated $189.3 million profit for General Dynamics.
By December 31. 1969 when the definitive contract was signed, the
■ r
production cost for 1,704 aircraft with engines and support equipment, 
which was estimated by General Dynamics to be $4,912 million and then 
readjusted upwards by the Air Force to $5,092 million, was again read­
justed. This time the contract called for a total cost of $4,733 million 
for only 491 airplanes, since the Navy’s F-111B had been abandoned due
to high costs and extreme weight. Thus, the costs were reduced by $359
45
million, but the production run in aircraft was cut by 1,213 planes.
The production unit cost of one F-111 would be just about $10 million, 
almost $7 million more per plane than the original 1962 price of 
$2.9 million.
The production program'for' the F-111 was still being reconsidered 
every fiscal year. In 1969, the then Secretary of Defense, Clark Clif­
ford , recommended that the total force level of the F-111 program be 
46
reduced,. even though it had been increased during that same year from
491 to 54? with the addition of the F-111F series, pushing the program
47cost up to $8,652 billion, with a unit cost of $15.8 million per copy.
In a prepared statement before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations
in 1 9 7 1 Secretary of the Air Force Seamans called for the concluding
of the F-111 procurement even at the expense of some reduction in the
number of aircraft. In an exchange with Representative Mahon of Texas,
Secretary Seamans stated:
I do not know how we got into it /F-111 program^? 
but I know that in the last two years we have been 
pressed to procure fewer F-111#s than we are now pro­
curing. The Office of Management and Budget has recom­
mended that we cancel out one qf the wings,' have only 
three wings rather than four.^
This action, if implemented, would end the present program with 
**54 F-111 aircraft at a cost of $7,989 million, or just about $1? mil­
lion per airplane,^some $14 million over the original unit price per 
plane•
Causes of Cost Growth
The increase in the unit cost of the TFX system as witnessed 
above can be attributed to a number of factors.
1. Decrease in the number of aircraft to be produced;
2. Increase in the number of versions or models of
the TFX, including those later abandoned;
3« Weapon systems capability, improvements;
4. Inflation;
5. Technical problems.5®
However, in a study done by the General Accounting Office on the 
"Status of the Acquisition of Selected Major Weapon Systems” of which 
the F-111 was a component system, the General Accounting Office con­
cluded that;
one of the most important causes of cost growth is 
that decisions are made to begin the process of in­
itiating a program before it has been demonstrated
adequately that the prerequisites for advancing into 
the contract definition phase have been satisfied.
I believe that there are several good reasons for accepting the 
above proposition as being true in the case of the TFX project. In a 
series of letters between Mr. Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General and 
Senator John McClellan* Chairman of the Permanent Subcommittee on Invest., 
ligations, we haye documented proof that certain components of the 
F-111 program had not been satisfactorily proven adequate, yet the con­
tract definition phase had already been entered into.
On March 21-, 196? Mr. Staats notified Senator McClellan that 
"the aircraft1s main wing carry-through assembly buckled during a static
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test”. Again on April 28, 196? Mr. Staats wrote Senator McClellan that 
the target cost of the crew escape module used in the F-111 and manufac­
tured by the McDonnell Company, ,5was established solely for the purpose 
of reaching a definitive base line for further negotiations and •... 
did not reflect McDonnell's realistic estimate of the cost of the cur­
rently authorized program.”^  On that same day Mr. Staats also mailed 
a study to Senator McClellan pertaining to the costs of the- engines used 
in the F-111. The study showed that the development costs of the Pratt 
and Whitney TF-30 jet engine were exceeding the requirements of the 
development contract as early as 1962, yet on December.31» 1966 the
Navy entered a production contract with Pratt and Whitney for their
54
TF-30 engine even though it did not meet cost specifications.
These letters .record flagrant cases of cost requirement and aero­
dynamic specification violations which the United States Air Force and 
Navy chose to ignore and consummated a production contract despite the 
lack of prerequisites for approval.
The General Accounting Office's study 3.1 so concluded that:
another significant cause for cost growth can be traced 
to the initial documents which define system mission 
requirements and technical performance specifications, 
including the estimate of costs to achieve them.-'*-5
Again, in a letter report from the Comptroller General Mr. Staats 
to Representative George H. Mahon, Chairman of the House's Committee on
Appropriations, the facts show that:
While the Air Force has ... certain controls and 
procedures governing the procurement of engineering data, 
these are designed primarily to effect savings in the cost 
of acquiring and storing the data and do not extend to 
the Government's obtaining accurate, complete and unre­
stricted data - one of the essentia], prerequisites for 
competitive procurement. The cost of the future procure­
ment of parts for the F-111 program can increaqp signifi­
cant! y unless corrective-measures are adopted.
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Comptroller Staats recommended that the Air Force "require closer 
monitoring of the quality of the technical data obtained for the F-111 
aircraft weapon system from the prime contractor.
In the final analysis, it would seem that cost inflation in the TFX 
program was a function not of the expected problems of capability im­
provements, inflation and technical problems, but also of the unsatis­
factory -'demonstration, of the adequacy of the project and insufficient 
utilization of data to define performance specifications and control 
costs at the outset of the program.
-32-
SUMMARY
Has the TFX met the original performance goals spelled out in the 
initial work statement?
The answer, of course, is a resounding "no". The TFX failed to 
perform up to expectation in terms of its weight, acceleration, altitude, 
distance performance and ferry range. As a result, it was unable to 
fulfill the multimission requirements for which it was designed. The 
United States Navy version, the F-111B, was inadequate for aircraft 
carrier use due to its considerable weight, and the British and Aus­
tralian Governments both canceled their purchase of the F-111 due to 
its excessive costs. The F-111es lack of maneuverability due to its
size and weight make it unacceptable as a tactical fighter, and thus
its mission has been reduced to that of interdiction bombing.
Have the costs of development and production of the TFX been ex­
cessive?
The development overruns totaled more than $1.6 billion, and the 
production overruns have been so excessive as to raise the unit price 
from its originally estimated $2.9 million to just short of $17 mil­
lion per aircraft. The causes of this increase in cost are many and 
varied,: Appendix #4 contains a dollar breakdown of the reasons for cost 
growth and the actual amount of inflation on a point by point basis.
Having established the fact that, (1) the TFX program failed to 
produce a plane capable of performing the mission for which it was de­
signed and (2) was' equally unable to .maintain control over the cost of
the project, I would like to turn now to a consideration of the manage­
ment factors that, I believe, contributed to the downfall of the TFX 
program.
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CHAPTER III. CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY 
CONTRACT SELECTION
Source Selection Process 
In order to comprehend the rationale behind the selection of a con­
tractor for the production of a major weapons system, it is necessary 
to understand the selection process.
The United States Air Force, in concert with the Navy,was given 
the responsibility of developing the TFX. The Air Force policy is that 
the selection of all weapons systems and subsystems should be deter-
i
mined by what they call■"system source selection procedures. *’
The normal procedure is to set up.a-System Source Selection Board. 
(SSSB). This Board'Investigates, evaluates and makes recommendations on 
a preferred source or sources for the development and production of a 
weapons system. The SSSB is composed of Air Force personnel, who are 
qualified and experienced in weapons procurement.
Accordingly, the objective of the SSSB is to evaluate the spe­
cific proposals that are presented to it by the private aerodynamic 
firms competing for a systems contract. The use of this technique de­
rives from a realization that the operational date for weapons delivery 
is a very crucial factor in ascertaining the true value or utility of 
a new weapons system. Thus, the. purpose of the SSSB is to save as 
much time as possible in the development period, by reducing the time 
during which the Air Force can maintain direct control, that is, during
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the formal competition to select the best company. System Source Selec­
tion is thus a technique to determine which private firm can most effec­
tively produce the requested weapons system, and to make this, determi-
2nation in the shortest possible time. Of course, the SSSB is geared 
to shortening the development cycle, but it is also supposed to increase 
the probabilities that the decisions being made are the best possible 
ones.
As a result, the Board designates an evaluation group to perform 
specified duties. This evaluation group may be subdivided into several 
teams to consider specific areas, such as tactical feasibility, logis­
tics, production and management. Each group analyzes and evaluates each 
proposal from the private corporations and scores each proposal accord­
ingly. The groups then meet to determine which company has the highest 
score. This is done by totaling the scores that each company received 
in each of the group evaluations. The chairman of the group evaluation 
then submits these'scores and their accompanying analyses to the Source 
Selection Board.
After the Source Selection Board has finished considering the 
recommendation of the evaluation group, it will then make its own 
evaluation. The Board then, in a secret vote, decides which firm it 
recommends as the source for the new system. The Board recommendation 
and the evaluation group study are sent to the Air Force Council, 
which is composed of the general officers who are the Deputy Chiefs of 
Staff. They in turn pass their recommendations on to the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, and in the TFX case, to the Chief of Naval 
Operations as well. The decision of the Chiefs of Staff is then for­
warded to the civilian Secretaries of the services, who then pass their
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decision on to the Secretary of Defense for review and concurrence*
The Secretary of Defense, in all cases, has the ultimate authority and 
responsibility in making the decisi-on.
The Military* s Choice 
The proposals from the private aerodynamic companies arrived at 
the Pentagon on December 6, 1961, just two months after the Air Force 
issued its work statement for TFX designs.
TFX research and development proposals were submitted by six 
contractors: Lockheed, McDonnell, North American, Republic, Boeing and 
General Dynamics. These proposals were delivered to the evaluation 
group of the SSSB for their immediate analysis. In early January of 
1962 the evaluation group reported that none of the six submitted de­
signs were acceptable. The group then recommended that further study 
contracts be given to both Boeing and General Dynamics, the two firms 
with the highest rating.
After further study was done by Boeing to redesign its airframe 
around another engine, and General Dynamics to redesign its airframe 
to better suit the Navy's uses, their proposals were resubmitted. The 
Source Selection Board on January 19, 1962, unanimously recommended 
that Boeing be given the contract to develop the TFX. At that time the 
Navy believed that Boeing Corporation had a better comprehension of the 
design problem that carrier flight entailed, and felt that the Boeing
design would be satisfactory with changes. The Navy found the General
ADynamics proposal unacceptable. The Air Force Council recommended 
limited study contracts be let to both companies, since it felt that 
the Source Selection .Board's recommendation to choose Boeing "could not
help but appear to be risky, premature and unjustified”, since the 
Boeing proposal still had not worked out all the problems of its design. 
Secretary North and Zuckert ordered a new ninety day study from both firms.
During this first evaluation all recommendations concerning the 
selection of a source indicated that Boeing Corporation be selected 
as the prime contractor. There were no positive recommendations for the 
General. Dynamics design.^
On April 2, 1962 the second group of proposals from Boeing and 
General Dynamics were received by the evaluation group. This time, the 
Navy made an independent evaluation of the design and its compatibility 
with carrier flight. The Navy concluded that neither design was accepta­
ble for their use. They added, however, that they felt that the Boeing
7design was substantially better than the General Dynamics proposal.
The Source Selection'/'Board recommended for the second time that 
the/Boeing Corporation be chosen as the source to develop the TFX. The 
Navy dissented in this vote, stating that they refused to approve the 
Boeing design as acceptable.
Since the: TFX was to be a biservice plane and since Secretary McNa­
mara, in his memo on the TFX, made it quite clear that the only way the 
Air Force would get its TFX was through a biservice program, the Navy 
^literally held a veto over the TFX. *5^
At the Secretarial level the decision was made to call for another 
evaluation. The “short round”]^  as it was called, gave the two compa­
nies only three weeks to correct the deficiencies in their designs, which 
at this time stemmed from the fact that neither design was suitable for 
carrier type tak©-off and landing.
All-recommendations made during the second evaluation, as was true
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of the first, stated that Boeing be chosen. There were no recommenda­
tions for General DynamicsJ 1
The evaluation group of the third or "short” round proposals called 
for the immediate approval of Boeing as the single source of development 
for the TFX. On June 20, 1962, the Source Selection Board recommended 
for the third time that Boeing be selected as the source since the Navy 
had now approved its design* The choice of Boeing was then sent on to the 
Air Force Council where it was unanimously recommended that Boeing be 
given the contract.
This recommendation was given to both Secretary of the Air Force 
Zuckert and Navy Secretary Korth. They both, in turn, refused to sign 
the recommendation of the Air Force Council. Instead, Secretary Zuckert 
sent notice to Boeing and General Dynamics giving them another paid study 
contract for sixty days at $2*5 million a p i e c e . ^
The fourth and final round of competition utilized a new. rule that 
differentiated it from the other three rounds* In the fourth competi­
tion, the evaluation group was allowed to work with each firm as though 
it were the selected contractor. Secretary McNamara instructed the Air 
Force to forgo the usual practice of remaining uninvolved for the sake 
of objective neutrality. Instead, McNamara authorized the Air Force to 
ifork closely with each competitor, permitting the Air Force to identify 
deficiencies in each design as they arose, not after the competition was 
over, as was usual. The Air Force was even allowed to suggest specific 
X'Tays of correcting the problem, although the Air Force could not tell the 
contractor what to use or which correction would best solve the problem.^ 3 
Apparently, McNamara felt that if "pure” competition could not produce 
a satisfactory design, then he would rig the competition so that it would.
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Secretary McNamara actually went so far as to tell both Boeing and 
General Dynamics what he wanted in their designs. Letters were sent 
to the presidents of both companies through the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, Roswell Gilpatric. In these letters, McNamara indicated the 
areas on which he would center in evaluating their proposals. The areas 
were: the plane’s operational capability, the degree of commonality, 
and the realism of the cost proposals.^
The final proposals were submitted on September 10, 1962. The e- 
valuation groups designated Boeing as its final choice. The Source 
Selection Board, on November 2, 1962, concurred with the selection and 
unanimous.ly recommended the selection of Boeing as the source for the 
TEX Development. The Board indicated that the reasons for the selection 
of Boeing * s design were:
1. Superiority in all major aspects of operational capability.
2. Lower quoted cost.
3. Positive ground deceleration mechanism - thrust reversers.
4. Less risk of foreign object damage and missile exhaust
degradation of engine performance due to overhead air 
16scoops.
The Air Force Coucil approved the selection of Boeing as the con­
tractor on November 8, 1962. Their recommendation was then passed on to 
Secretary Korth and Zuckert, but neither of the Secretaries signed their 
approval to this recommendation. -
During the fourth round, as was true of the other three, all recom­
mendations made concerning- the selection of a development.source chose 
the Boeing Corporation. In fact, the fourth evaluation showed complete 
unanimity. There was absolutely no disagreement in ,any group. The entire
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military chain of command recommended the Boeing Corporation.^
Secretary McNamara*s Decision
Even though the numerous generals, admirals and sundry other of­
ficers of the military chain of command recommended the selection of 
the Boeing Corporation for the development of the TFX, the civilians at 
the Secretarial level had other ideas.
After a breakfast meeting with Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, 
Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert and'the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for. Research and Development, Dr. James H. Wakelin, Secretary of 
Defense McNamara decided to select General Dynamics as the TFX contractor. 
In an official memo, dated November 21, 1962, and released to the public 
on November 24, 1962, the Secretary of Defense announced that the General 
Dynamics Corporation had been awarded the contract for the development 
of the 22 prototype TFX aircraft.
If the TFX project was to prove controversial, certainly the first 
step in that direction was the decision to give the development contract 
to General Dynamics. The circumstances surrounding this decision were 
absolutely unprecedented. In the history of Pentagon procurement, this 
was the longest time ever taken to make a decision on a major source 
selection. Never before had there been four individual evaluations of 
contract proposals for the development of a major weapons system. Above 
all, this was the first time that the civilian administrators of the 
Pentagon had ever overruled the unanimous- recommendation of their top 
military officers on a major source selection without first consulting 
them. ^
The sole justification for the selection of General Dynamics was
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the short secretarial "memorandum for the record" of November 21, 1962* 
Approved and signed by the Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert, the Sec­
retary of the Navy Korth and Secretary of Defense McNamara, this written 
statement gives the rationale for the choice of General Dynamics over 
the Boeing design. The memorandum stated that:
Inasmuch as either of the proposed aircraft 
can perform the mission required by both services, 
and the evaluation of the proposals provide no 
overriding margin between the competitors, it is 
necessary to consider other factors in evaluating 
these aircraft.
The "other factors" considered were the degree of commonness, the 
tooling and manufacturing of the aircraft, and the cost proposals of 
both companies. Specifically, the three Secretaries declared that the 
General Dynamics version of the TFX had a higher degree of commonality 
of parts, Q5fo as opposed to the 60$ commonality of the Boeing design.
This greater similarity in the General Dynamics plane, they felt, would 
"reduce weapons system costs by maximizing similarities of Air Force and
i 0 4
Navy versions and by maximum use of common equipment and structure.1 
They also felt that Boeing's proposed tooling and manufacturing process 
would reduce the commonality of the Navy version and "further manufactur­
ing problems may be introduced which are not envisioned by Boeing at 
this time.Finally, they felt that "the Boeing formula for estimating 
the cost of the aircraft resulted from an overoptimistic impression of 
the complexity of the T F X . T h e  Secretaries felt that Boeing's proposed 
use of thrust reversers, sweep wing, titanium and overhead air-scoops 
were examples, "if our experience is any guide, that much redesign and 
testing would be necessary, contrary to the reduced engineering estimates 
and cost indicated, in the Boeing proposal.
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They noted, conversely, "that the General Dynamics proposal ap­
plies extensive engineering and test effort to the development program 
and could be considered as conservative. It is felt that this approach 
is more likely to meet the development milestones and cost goals than 
the Boeing proposal.
This memorandum of November 21, 1962 was the only document used 
at the Secretarial level to justify the reversal of the Source Selection 
Board. There were no detailed studies, reports, or analyses to support 
the reasoning used in the memorandum, as had been done by the SSB in 
their decision-making process.
The undocumented and somewhat vague criticisms of the Boeing pro­
posal, as well as the undocumented and vague commendations of the Gener­
al Dynamics proposal, seem less reasonable when one considers the fact 
that none of the Secretaries who signed the document had had any previ­
ous background or training in aerodynamics. Therefore, the abovementioned 
"experience as guide" was non-existent. D
The unjustifiable nature of the civilian decision to reverse the 
recommendation of the Source Selection Board is magnified by the know­
ledge that the civilian Secretaries did not discuss the reversal with
their Air Force and Naval advisers, nor did they consult them prior to
27making their final decision. 1
The 1963 Congressional hearings on the TFX dealt,v;in large part, 
with the so-called "other factors" of the November 21 memorandum. Civil­
ian and military technical, experts testified about the proposed use of 
thrust reversers, over-head air scoops and titanium, as-well as the 
other "optimistic” features of the Boeing design. All of the-various 
scientists refuted the technical criticism of the Boeing proposal as
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recorded in the memorandum from the Secretaries. The concept of 
commonality as a major cost-saving innovation was dismissed by several 
experts^- this topic will be explored more fully in Chapter IV of 
this study. The Investigating Subcommittee examined the Secretarial 
idea of "cost realism” in great detail.
The 1963 Hearings established the fact that an elaborate system 
of cost estimating had been worked-'-out. by the Pentagon. There were 
three sets of TFX cost estimates available to the Secretarial decision­
makers. First, the contractors1 proposals as prepared and submitted by 
the cost accounting departments of both Boeing and General Dynamics 
were in the hands of the Pentagon. These figures showed General Dyna­
mics® proposal to have been $5*455*5 million for development and pro­
duction of 1,704 aircraft. The Boeing proposal was $5?364,3 million 
for the:same production run. The contractors* proposal showed Boeing*s 
cost estimate to be $9t.2 million lower than General Dynamics *.
Second, the Air Force cost team of the evaluation group found it 
necessary to make certain adjustments to the contractors* proposals be­
cause the contractors had not followed the format for categorising costs 
as prescribed by the Air Force. The result of the Air Force adjustment 
was the correction of the Boeing figures to $5*38?*5 million and the 
General Dynamics figures to $5*803*5 million for the total program.
This again gave Boeing the lower bid and had increased the distance be-
31tween the two proposals by $416 million.
Third,, the "Air Force Cost Standards Estimates” was the attempt 
by the cost team of the evaluation group to arrive at realistic figures, 
for what each contractorfs presentation of the TFX would actually cost,
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not just what the contractors said it would cost. The figures were 
based on learning curve projections of estimates made by the cost team. 
The Air Force Cost Standard Estimates showed the Boeing total program 
costs to be $6,983 million and the costs for General Dynamics to be 
$7,083, a difference of $100 million.^ The General Dynamics proposal 
was said to be more realistic, however, since it differed from the Air 
Force cost standards by 18$ whereas the Boeing, proposal differed by 22$, 
with an individual, difference of h$.^3
However, errors were discovered in the Air Force Cost Standards 
Estimates calculations. The errors were in the projection of the learn­
ing curves used in the cost estimation. When the errors were corrected 
and the cost estimate reprojected, it was discovered that the Boeing 
program was nox* $7,273 million compared to $7,h23 million for the Gener­
al Dynamics proposal. Now, even though the Boeing proposal was still 
$150 million lower than the General Dynamics bid, the difference be­
tween the proposals was only 2$ as compared with the Air Force cost 
standards. At the same time, the Air Forcefs cost engineer for the 
TFX had stated that when the negotiated price fell xhLthin 3$ of each 
other, then costs would not be sufficiently low enough to warrant using 
price as the sole determinant in axrarding the contract.^ Since the 
price of the two proposals was well under the 3$ barrier, Secretary 
MeNamax^a was asked to discuss the matter before the Investigation Sub- 
ommittee. Mr. McNamara, sent a prepared statement to the Subcommittee 
in which he said?
the letter /“"Subeommitte *s invitation to discuss the 
states that the cost standards prepared by 
the Air Force xvere "used by the Department of Defense 
in making its decision on the award of the TFX contract."
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The fact is, however, that at the secretarial 
.level the cost estimates prepared by the Air 
Force were considered so unreliable as an in­
dication of the ultimate differential in re­
search, development, and production costs be­
tween the programs of the two contractors that 
they could not be used as a foundation for the 
source selection.-^
Secretary McNamara's dismissal of the Air Force cost estimates 
as unreliable prompted an Immediate investigation into the question of 
how Mr. McNamara arrived at the conclusion that the General Dynamics 
proposal was the most realistic of the two cost bids.
The General Accounting Office interviewed Secretary McNamara on. 
April 16, 1963. The investigators from the GAO sought to establish the 
factual grounds on which the TFX decision was made. Mr. William A. Newman 
of the GAO testified before the Investigating Subcommittee that:
We requested any information that was pre­
pared at his level concerning the cost estimates 
inasmuch as he had stated that the cost standards 
prepared by the Air Force were unrealistic.
Secretary McNamara went back, back to the 
beginning, to give us the story of the whole 
philosophy of the program and the planning. When 
it came time to examine the records, and we had 
access to anything we wanted, he stated that hee 
had the figures in his head, indicating to us 
that he did not have them on paper.3°
Mr. Hassell B. Bell, also of the GAO gave a similar response to the 
question concerning the cost realism figures. In an exchange with Senator 
Henry Jackson and Senator John McClellan before the Subcommittee, Mr. Bell 
made these remarks:
Bell; Mr. McNamara told us at the time he was 
reviewing the documents,that certain en­
gineering problems occurred to him in 
which, in his judgement, Boeing had es­
timated their* costs lower than they should 
have been...
Jackson; If cost- realism is one of the key points, 
as I understand the Secretary's position,
along with commonality...wouldn't he have to 
determine the validity of the cost figures 
as proposed by the competing companies?
Bell: Both Secretaries ■/""Zuckert and Korth 7 
told us they were relying upon their 
experience in the field previously, and 
that they were able to make rough judgments.
McClellan: Make what kind of judgments?'
Bell: Rough judgments. I think that is the word 
Mr. McNamara used; yes.3?
In the final analysis, there was no actual evaluation of the costs 
before the decision was made. The decision was made on the basis of a 
non-existent "experience in the field". The only review of the cost 
proposals confirmed the fact that Boeing did, indeed, have a lower cost 
bid. The official document justifying the award of the contract to Gener­
al Dynamics used the concept of greater"cost realism" as the basis of the 
award, yet there are no figures to substantiate this claim. In effect, 
there was no systems analysis done on the TFX proposal.
Robert Art, in defense of the McNamara decision, states that:
Ultimately, therefore, the TFX decision did 
not turn on who was right or wrong on the techni­
cal issues. Rather it turned on the group that 
had the greater power to make its judgments on • 
those issues prevail.3^
Before considering the "group that had the greater power to pre­
vail", the civilian analyst, I would like to examine a few factors that 
are 3-ess tangible than cost realism figures, but which come to light in 
any examination of the TFX project.
Politics, Economics and Conflict of Interest
Decisions on military spending and defense procurement are never 
made in a socio-economic-political vacuum. Within the political process 
there are diverse and legitimate interests, as well.as personal inter­
ests and political expediency. In the case of the TFX, the political
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prudence and political process may have been displaced by the technical 
rationality of the "new management" techniques, yet the vestiges of pol­
itical favoritism and personal aggrandizement are everywhere evident.
There were certain political implications that were quite obvious. 
The Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson, the former Secretary of the Navy 
John Conrally and the new Secretary of the Navy Kcrth were a3*l from the 
state of Texas. General Dynamics President Roger Lewis was a former 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force. The fact that he was assisted in 
bringing the TFX contract to General Dynamics was underscored by the 
press. It was reported that Mr, Lewis got help from "that charming arm- 
twisting Texan, Lyndon B. Johnson. Pentagon insiders were said to refer 
to the TFX as the LBJ".39
The. President was not unaware of the political implications of 
selecting a contractor for the largest aircraft contract ever let.
Texas and New York, where General Dynamics and Grumman - the major 
subcontractor - would build the planef - commanded sixty-nine electoral 
votes, far exceeding the nine votes of Washington, where Boeing made its 
headquarters, and the eight of Kansas where it planned to build its TFX.**® 
Noticeable, also, was the fact that John Kennedy carried both Texas and 
New York in 19&0, while losing both Kansas and Washington to the Re­
publicans.
In testimony before the Investigating Subcommittee, Senator Sam 
Ervin asked Secretary of Defense McNamara if the fact that the Vice Pres­
ident of the United States was a resident of the state of Texas had any­
thing to do with the awarding of the TFX to General Dynamics of Fort 
Worth, Texas. Secretary McNamara replied "absolutely not" and went on 
to say that:
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to the best of my knowledge, no one has submitted any 
evidence whatsoever indicating that I was influenced 
in the slightest degree by political matters. Specifi­
cally, the Vice President never discussed the matter 
with me ... nor, to the best of my knowledge, did any 
other political figure in the country discuss the 
matter with me.
Nevertheless, in a memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy and 
the Secretary of the Air Force dated January 30, 1962, Secretary 
Namara stated:
I have told the President that we propose to 
discuss with him our recommendations regarding the 
final. award of the TFX contract before the contract 
is let. ^
If the political implications were not apparent to President 
Kennedy, certainly the economic aspects of the TFX contract were. 
General Ijynaraics was in severe economic trouble in 1962. The B-5& 
bomber program was ending production, General Dynamics had suffered a 
$425 million loss on commercial jets and-it cried that if it lost out 
on'the TFX It would have to lay off 5*000 workers at its sprawling 
Fort Worth plant.^  There is certainly little guessing involved as 
to just how important the TFX contract proved to be for General Dy­
namics * Forbes magazine noted that without the F-111 ''General Dynamics 
will be out of the military aircraft business within a year or so. 
Senator John McClellan, the chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee 
even went so far as to state that he could accept the decision if 
McNamara would admit that the Pentagon really wanted, to keep the al­
most idle General Dynamics plant open in the Interest of national 
defense. -^5 McNamara, of course, insisted that the best design proposal 
had won out.
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A third and final factor that the TFX contract investigators 
brought out was the activity of two of McNamara's top aides, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Gilpatric and Secretary of the Navy Korth.
Roswell Gilpatric came to the Department of Defense from the 
prestigious New York lav/ firm of Cravath, Swain and Moore. As a private 
lawyer Mr. Gilpatric had servedoas-legalocouncilvto General.Dynamics..
Before coming to the Pentagon, Gilpatric was to have severed his con­
nections with the New York law firm and with General Dynamics as a 
consequence of that action. He stated that he did not take a leave of 
absence from the law firm, but rather, that he resigned from Cravath,
Swain and Moore.
Investigation of Gilpatric *s association with General Dynamics 
■showed that (1) Mr. Gilpatric had spent approximately one-third of his 
total time working for General Dynamics before accepting the Defense 
Department post, (2) he had billed General Dynamics for $110,000 in 
fees for the wci*k,w (3) he had acted primarily in a policy level advisory 
capacity for the General Dynamics Corporation, including attendance at 
a majority of the board of directors® meetings, and (4) he had been replaced 
as council for General Dynamics by his senior partner, who subsequently 
joined the board of directors of General Dynamics. The record also 
shows that Mr. Gilpatric attempted to conceal from the Subcommittee the 
significance of his past association with General Dynamics and that he 
was apparently on a leave of absence from the law firm since he was drawing 
$20,000 a year under a severance agreement with the partnership firm and 
the firms insurance underwriters recorded him as being on leave of absence, 
not retired.
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Dispite the potential for conflict of interest in his background,
Mr. Gilpatric refused to disqualify himself from the TFX award decision.
He stated clearly before the Investigating Subcommittee that:
As Deputy Secretary of Defense,...my part in the TFX 
source selection process consisted primarily of in­
forming myself as to the elements in the program de­
termination and source selection and giving the 
Secretary my best judgement to.assist him in making 
his decision..... it was my conclusion in November 
2.9629 when Mr. McNamara made his decision, and it is 
my view now, that the decision to select the General 
Dynamics proposal rather than the Bgeing proposal.for 
the TFX contract was the right one.
Upon leaving his Pentagon post on January 20, 1964, Mr. Gilpatric
rejoined the law firm of Cravath, Cwaine and Moore. Gilpatric was advanced
in seniority in the firm and moved above six other partners to become the
' 4 8fourth ranking partner within the firm.
Fred Korth became Secretary of the Navy on January 3* 1962. Mr.
Korth was a former Assistant Secretary of the Army and he was returning 
to the Pentagon from the presidency of -Port Worth * s Continental National 
Bank.
Secretary Korth, in his appearances before the Subcommittee on
Investigations stated that he had participated in the TFX decision-making
process. At the same time, Mr. Kcrth emphasized the fact that he remained
completely objective in the TFX decision. In a prepared statement read
before the Subcommittee Secretary Korth said:
I am aware that public confidence in our public 
process demand not only impartiality but also the 
appearance of impartiality. Conscious that my home 
is in Fort Worth, and recognizing the minor part that 
the Navy has in the total procurement, I therefore 
deliberately refrained from taking a lead role in 
•reaching the decision and consciously viewed the two 
proposals with complete objectivity...1, in my best 
judgement, made the decision for the Navy and I stand
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firm today in the conviction that the General 
Dynamics and the TFX offers the Navy the best 
aircraft in the time available and at the least 
program cost. 9
In.a propaedeutic appearance before Congress* fir. Korth stated that 
he intended to return to his Fort Worth based bank after his government 
service. He related that he was retaining $160,000 worth of stock in his 
bank. Thus, the facts of Mr. North’s financial background were made public 
in an effort at maintaining objectivity and avoiding conflict of interest 
while in public office.
Unfortunately, public knowledge of Secretary North’s financial 
interests were not enough to sustain his image as a man of integrity. 
Investigations performed by the Subcommittee revealed that Mr. Korth had 
at least sixteen contacts with officials of the General Dynamics Corpor­
ation during the TFX selection process. Letters unearthed by the 
investigators disclosed that various bank officials wrote Korth after 
he became Secretary of the Navy, thanking him for securing small accounts. 
North’s own letters to former associates in Texas included invitations 
to come to Washington, D.C. for a visit aboard the Navy yacht Sequoia,
50some of these personal letters being written on his official stationary.
Korth had testified that he did own stock in the Continental National
Bank and that his bank did business with General Dyanmics on a modest
scale while he was president. When pressed by Senator Carl Mundt on
what he meant by “modest scale” of business, Mr. Korth stated:
I can define It to this extent, that the loan 
limit of the bank at the time I was there was 
$600,000.
In testimony before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
on July 23, 1963 Secretary Korth offered a challenge to Senator Mundt:
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Senator Mundt, I repeat that I believe that I am 
a man of integrity. If you find or this committee 
finds that I am not, certainly you should so re­
commend to the President and I will promptly hand
in my resignation.52
Other information compiled by the Subcommittee concerning Secretary 
Korth and his business interests were handed over to the Justice Depart­
ment. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy suggested that a resignation 
was in order. On October 14, 1963 Secretary Korth submitted his resigna­
tion citing the demands of private business as the reason for his
53retirement.
It should be noted that the Justice Department ruled that both 
Secretary Korth and -Deputy Secretary Gilpatric were innocent of any
illegal conflict of interest.
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civilian AND MILITARY RELATIONS
McNamara*s Philosohpy 
Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated the major factors under­
lying his innovations in defense procedures and organization when he stated:
We do have a basic management philosophy that we 
are trying to establish.as a foundation for our 
day-to-day administration. It is a philosophy 
based on a decision pyramid and a system of ad­
ministration in which all possible decisions are 
pushed to the bottom of that pyramid.54
At the same time, Mr. McNamara, while ruminating about the role of
the Secretary of Defense, relates that:
the Secretary of Defense could play an active role 
providing aggressive leadershlp-~questing, suggest­
ing alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating 
progress. This active ro^e represents my own 
philosophy of management.
McNamara * s active management at the top is antithetical to his
previously quoted philosophy of a decision pyramid that would push all
possible decisions to the bottom of the pyramid. It has been stated
that with active management at the top there is “an inevitable tendency
56
in bureaucracies for decisions to be made at higher and higher levels.”
This, in fact, is exactly what happened at the Department of Defense
during Secretary McNamara’s tenure there. By fully utilizing the
statutory authority of the 195^ National Security Act, McNamara asserted
5?and maintained control over the Pentagon. He took management control 
of the national defense effort away from the military and placed it in 
the hands of a civilian bureaucracy, which he erected and which operated
-5*u
at his command. He made no attempt to effect this change through the 
existing Pentagon bureaucracy. McNamara simply superimposed a new 
bureaucracy over the already existing one.^  In this new bureaucracy, 
McNamara's'team of civilian analysts became the dictators and economic 
efficiency was their rule of law.
The power in the Department of Defense had become overcentralized 
in the hands of a civilian Secretary. McNamara realigned’..the administrat­
ive channels into a monolithic instrument of government. On major defense 
problems, McNamara made his own analysis and arrived at his own conclus­
ions --no matter who else might be working on them. ^  His adamant stance 
on self drawn conclusions led to charges of "arrogance"— and with some 
justification.. When. .Navy and Air Force officals . recommended discontinuing 
the;. Navy version of the F-111 due to its inability to land on aircraft
carriers, McNamara retorted that""the Navy will take it whether it wants
60 ....it .pr not.!t
I, '. The new bureaucracy demo3.ished the morale of the military and con­
tributed greatly to the .lengthening delays in the development and produc­
tion of new weapons systems. McNamara's civilian analysts believed that 
the technological revolution was over and thus were reluctant to spend
McNamara * s New Bureaucracy 
Secretary of Defense McNamara erected, a hierarchy of civilian admin­
istrators in the Pentagon. They were an atavism of the World War II Ivy
(PLeague team of Lo.vett, McCloy ana Forrestal. Deputy Secretary of De­
fense was Roswell L. Gil.patric, a corporate lawyer and graduate of Yale., 
Later, Gilpatric was replaced by Cyrus'R. Vance, another corporate 'lawyer
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and Yale graduate. Others were Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. 
Zuclert of Yale, Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze from Princeton, 
William'P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, 
a Harvard graduate, and political trouble-shooter Adam Yarmolinsky, the 
Special Assistant to Secretary McNamara, a Harvard graduate with a law 
degree from Yale.
Directly below the Ivy League administrators was another echelon 
of civilians, often referred to as the ”Whiz Kids". This group of 
pentagon civilians was composed of economic and mathematical analysts 
who were enjoined by Secretary McNamara to measure precisely the mil­
itary needs of the nation.
The "Whiz Kids” were dominated by three distinct personalities* 
Charles J, Hitch was appointed comptroller of the Department of De­
fense. Hitch, was the former Chairman of the Research Council of the 
RAND Corporation and an expert in economic analysis and defense.
Alain C. Enthoven, the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, was 
an economist who specialized in strategy and strategic weapons. He 
was also a colleague of Hitch at the RAND Corporation. It was the 
efforts of Charles Hitch and Alain Enthoven that produced the new 
McNamara technique of cost-efficiency In strategic weapons procure­
ment .^  Finally, the Director of Research and Engineering for the 
Pentagon was Dr. Harold Brown, the former director of the University 
of California®s Livermore Laboratory.
In essence, McNamara substantially increased his own staff and 
at the same time increased their responsibility without significantly 
enlarging the two thousand man Office of the Secretary of Defense.
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Secretary McNamara increased the responsibility and importance 
of his personal staff by setting up task forces on the most immediate 
and important issues within the Department of Defense, staffing them 
from within his own office and demanding quantitative answers "with the 
numbers in them."^5 Each task force project raised questions about how 
things were done in a particular area, and then asked how things could 
be done better. The projects ranged from basic questions of military 
strategy to detailed technical enquiries into the procurement process.
As I have stated before, the key staff member in all of these 
projects was the Defense Department’s Comptroller, Charles J, Hitch.
It was Hitch’s responsibility as Assistant Secretary of Defense to in­
itiate a new system of functional budgeting into the Pentagon. With 
the assistance of Alain Enthoven and his systems analysis group, Hitch 
prepared the basic data, the facts and figures, that would justify 
changes in the existing Department of- Defense system of budgeting.
The staff of Dr. Harold Brown in the Research and Engineering 
Department of the Pentagon was called upon by Hitch to review the 
entire spectrum of scientific and technical activity that would shape 
the weapon systems of the military over the corning decade. The staff 
of Systems Analysis and Research and Engineering would then examine 
the available data and determine what weapons system configuration was 
most efficient and effective.
The data and information compiled by the "Whiz Kids” was commun­
icated back up the bureaucracy to Secretary McNamara and his team of 
administrators, who would then make the ultimate decisions regarding 
weapons system procurement.
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It goes without saying that responsible decisions can only be made 
on the basis of adequate information. In this case, the information 
was as adequate as the system used in analyzing each weapon.
I would like to turn now to an examination of the McNamara system 
of analysis as it was applied to the TFX program.
Civilian Analyst and Military Procurement
During the McNamara years in the Pentagon a number of revolution­
ary techniques in military procurement were initiated. These new tech­
niques stemmed from Secretary McNamara's belief In the ideal of accom­
plishing national security objectives at the least possible cost. The 
emphasis was or the most efficient use of resources. McNamara and his 
civilian analysts reduced the concept of a military decision, including 
the elements of policy and strategy, to that of an economic decision. 
Their rationale was summed up in the statement:
Military decisions, whether they specifically 
Involve budgetary allocations or not, are 1 
their important aspects economic decisions.
The important aspect that links military decisions to economic 
decisions was the selection of alternatives or what economic theory 
would call "the logic of choice'5^'7 In economics, the logic of choice 
prescribes that each unit of input into the economic system - be it 
capital, labor or government spending - must produce the maximum unit 
of output utility, because we live in a world in which input resources 
are limited.
The civilian analysts in the Pentagon worked under the assumption 
that military-economic studies which compared alternative ways of accom­
plishing national security objectives, and which tried to determine the
i one oi 
>6
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alternatives that contribute the most utility for a given cost, or 
achieve a given objective at the least cost, was the best way to decide 
on a weapons system.
This technique demanded that all possible alternative methods of
approaching each military problem be costed before and not after the
69decision had been made on which alternative to use. Thus, the selec­
tion of the weapons system was based on economic criteria. Economy was 
the true test of the alternatives, and economy would decide what was to 
be chosen for development.
This new method insisted that costs be considered while formula­
ting the programs to meet the military requirements, instead of the old 
practice of drawing up programs exclusively on the grounds of military 
requirements, costing them and then deciding whether there was a budget­
ary allotment capable of paying for such a program. Under McNamara’s 
method the budget would not predetermine the strategy to be followed; 
rather, the strategy would determine the size and structure of the 
defense budget.
These military-economic studies or cost-effectiveness techniques 
would thus relate the output or military effectiveness of a program to 
its cost, the input factor.
In the case of the TFX, the Air Force work statement called for 
the development of an aircraft that was a bomber, a fighter, a reconnais­
sance craft, and a transoceanic plane as well. It would be used for 
nuclear and. non-nuclear missions, and it would be used in a strategic 
as well as a tactical role. McNamara reasoned that if the TFX could be 
designed with so many capabilities, then these same capabilities could 
be used to meet the requirements of all the military services, not just
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the Air Force. McNamara and his analysts felt that the potential effect­
iveness of the TFX would be more fully realized if it were not confined
70to use by the Air Force alone.
If the TFX concept were expanded to include the other services,
McNamara knew/ the duplication of tactical fighters for all four branches
would be eliminated. With the end ofmulti-service duplication, the
costs of developing and producing one tactical fighter to fulfill the
needs of all the services would bring a corresponding reduction in costs,
71
or so it was believed.
However, in the case of the TFX, as I have stated before, there
were no real systems analysis or cost-effectiveness studies performed
72before the decision to develop it was made. In effect, a vicarious con­
cept of cost realism was used in place of cost-effectiveness. The civil­
ian analysts introduced the idea of commonality as the integral element 
in cost reduction-.for. the TFX. At the same time, the insertion of what 
the sfWhiz Kids.” labeled PDP, or "program definition phase{% into the pro­
curement competition was an attempt to protect the Department of Defense 
from committing.large sums of money to a program before it was fully de­
fined. The function of commonality and program definition was to bring 
about a development program that would produce an effective TFX at the 
least cost to the government - both of these innovations will be exam­
ined in de-pth in the next chapter.
Despite the fact that cost-effectiveness studies were not used in 
the TFX decision, the criterion of economic efficiency remained intact.
So that when Mr. McNamara made his decision to select General Dynamics 
as the source for the TFX, he couched his motives in terms of cost 
realism.
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I would like to consider the reaction of the military professionals 
in the Defense Department to the sudden incursion of the civilian analysts 
in the field of military procurement, before moving on to the innovations 
of commonality and program definition.
Military View of the Civilian Analyst 
Even prior to Secretary McNamara's November 21, 19&2 decision to 
overrule his military advisors and select General Dynamics for the TFX 
project, the TFX program had a history of service opposition. The new 
management technique of the civilian analysts was the major irritant in 
civilian and military relations.
The McNamara team of analysts demanded that the military services 
combine their separate development programs for tactical fighters into, 
a single common program. The military professionals saw that a biservice 
TFX program would lay the groundwork for a paradigm that would decrease 
the autonomy of the services and enlarge the powders of the Office of 
Secretary of Defense in development programs. It was the feeling of the 
military that a superior civilian authority might portend the end of all 
effective service programs In the area of weapons development. The 
civilians' use of the "military-economic studies, which are touted as 
the new mode of strategic planning" was seen as "the greatest challenge 
to military professionalism.
The military men at the Pentagon during the McNamara years resented 
the implication that computer calculations, operational analysis and ob­
scure theories somehow had greater weight in the decision-making pro­
cess than the experience of uillitarj^  men and the lessons of military 
history. Their thinking was represented by the view that:
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setting the goals of military planning within the
framework of overall national political goals, is
central to military professionalism; providing a 
series of alternative means for the achievement of 
.military goals is also central to military profession­
alism, There is no scientific basis for supposing 
that the civilian analyst has superipr or even com­
parable credentials for such tasks. 4
This is not to say that the service professionals were uncomfort­
able with the idea of systems analysis or cost realism.. Rather, the
military officers of the Defense Department were concerned with the 
fact that cost effectiveness seemed to be working at the wrong level
of administration - above the professional military echelon instead of
75in an advisory capacity to the military.
The military professionals were quite outspoken and frank in 
their depiction of McNamara's new management technique. Air Force 
General Thomas D* White represented most of the professional officers 
in the Pentagon when he said that ,}in common with other military men
V ;• t
I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, trees-full-of-owls 
type of so-called defense intellectuals who have been brought into 
this nation’s capitol."'^ In the 1963 hearing on the TFX, both Gen­
eral Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and Admiral George 
W. Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations, openly criticized the 
Secretary of Defense’s selection of General Dynamics over the Source 
Selection Board’s choice of Boeing.The result of this criticism had 
direct effects upon the individuals concerned, the results of which 
ramified throughout the services. Only weeks after testifying before 
the Subcommittee on Investigations, Aviation Week reported that 
'•Admiral George it Anderson was not reappointed as chief of naval 
operations because he capped a series of disagreements with Defense
Secretary McNamara by refusing him a copy of testimony he was going to 
give to the Senate Subcommittee investigating the TFX contract award .... 
the testimony was among the most critical of McNamara's decisions that 
any witness has g i v e n . T h e  partial reappointment of General LeMay for
only a year's tenure as Air Force chief of staff was conditioned in some
7$part by his public disagreements with Secretary McNamara.
The end result of this type of arbitrary and vindictive action was 
to lower the confidence and trust between the civilian and military eche­
lons in the Pentagon.^0 A group of admirals interviewed in the July, 1967 
issue of Armed Forces Magazine summed up their feeling, about .the manage­
ment revolution in the Pentagon and the TFX in particular, when they 
stated that:
/"’The/F-111 project performance strongly suggests 
that when officer, experience and expertise is left out 
of a weapon development evaluation, the Defense Depart­
ment is not necessarily better off. Indeed, economic analysis, 
with its attendant characteristic of making certainties on 
paper out of technological uncertainties, in fact, seems 
to have, produced precisely the program overruns, time 
slippage and performance degradation that same analysis 
promised to avoid. 1
In effect,' Mr. McNamara's revolution in management at the Pentagon 
transformed the expert career military officer into the neophyte at 
procurement and the inexperienced political appointee into the seasoned 
professional in military decision-making.
SUMMARY
How was the TFX contract awarded?
In Chapter III, I discussed the military source selection process 
which was designed to evaluate and determine which private aerodynamics 
firm would be the most efficient producer of the aircraft. In essence, 
the Source Selection Board represented the military's choice for the 
contractor, since it was composed of military officers who were experts 
in the field, of weapons procurement. The Source Selection Board, after 
four complete evaluations, chose the Boeing Corporation to be the prime 
contractor in the TFX program.
However, at the Secretarial level, the recommendation of the mili~' 
tary*s Source Selection Board was overruled. Secretary of Defense McNa­
mara and his so-called "whiz; kids " made the final judgement and awarded 
the contract to General Dynamics, defending their decision on the grounds 
that the General Dynamics design was more cost realistic despite the fact 
that they had never done any cost-effectiveness studies on the TFX , and 
disregarding the fact that Boeing's design was less costly as well as 
operationally superior.
Consideration was given to the fact that there were certain politi­
cal, economic as well as personal implications in this arbitrary decision, 
from which no definite conclusions can be drawn, but which surround the 
decision in a penumbra of doubt.
Was the military establishment pleased with the new management tech­
niques and its resulting TFX contract award?
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The military professionals of the Pentagon were quite apprehensive 
about the overcentralization of power in the hands of the civilian analysts 
as a result of the revolution in defense management. The establishing of 
a new bureaucracy of civilian administrators and analysts over the mili­
tary professionals, using economic and mathematical analyses to make stra­
tegic military decisions without regard to the military's experience and 
expertise in that area, demolished their morale.
In the end, the total effect of the new management techniques was 
the lowering of confidence and trust between the civilian and military 
echelons in the Department of Defense and an outright rejection by the 
military of the product of those techniques - the TFX aircraft.
It would appear that Mr. McNamara forgot that the Defense Depart­
ment was not a corporation, and that, in a democracy, important disputes 
have to be settled by persuasion and compromise,, not just by giving or­
ders. It is certain that Secretary McNamara failed to carry.the high- 
ranking Pentagon brass with him to the extent that he might have, had 
he remained more in tune with the rules and standards of a political 
democracy.
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CHAPTER IV. PROCUREMENT INNOVATIONS OF CIVILIAN ANALYST
COMMONALITY
Conceptual Origins 
Secretary McNamara’s efforts at cost control and the most efficient 
use of resources took the form of two radically new innovations - common­
ality;, and non-prototype competition.
’^ Commonality” was the abbreviated Pentagon terminology for the 
McNamara idea of designing a weapons system that would fulfill the mission 
requirements of two or more branches of the service. The idea was based 
on the principle of the interchangeability of parts between the different 
versions of the TFX for each service. McNamara reasoned that if the ser­
vice requirements for a new fighter aircraft could be built into one air­
plane, then the resulting non-duplication of aircraft by the service 
branches for essentially the same mission, and the economies of scale 
offered by a large buy for all the services would substantially reduce 
the cost of development and production.
The idea of building a multiservice fighter-bomber utilising a com­
mon airframe and parts goes back to Secretary McNamara's first weeks in 
office. In an effort at understanding and controlling the functions of 
the Department of Defense, Secretary McNamara commissioned a series of 
studies to be undertaken on all segments of Defense responsibility and 
national security objectives. Out of the study on limited war conducted 
by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, came the first recommenda-
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tion Tor the development of a multiservice aircraft capable of both 
conventional and nuclear warfare.
The concern of the Secretary of Defense for greater efficiency and 
lower cost elevated the concept of commonality from a theoretical desire 
to an absolute necessity. In his September 1, 1961 memorandum establish­
ing the work-statement requirements for the new TFX program, McNamara 
included the charge that "changes to the Air Force tactical version of 
the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a mini­
mum. "3
The TFX work statement that was delivered to the private airframe 
companies for their contract bids carried more detailed instructions:
Common design and common equipment will 
be used whenever possible, to satisfy the re­
quirements of both services...A single aircraft
for both the Air Force tactical missions and the .Ll
Navy fleet air defense mission will be undertaken.
Thus, the concept of commonality was originated by the civilian 
staff of the Secretary of Defense and Was brought to fruition in the
Implementation in the TFX 
In his decision to select General Dynamics as the source for 
development of the TFX, Secretary McNamara stated that his choice of 
General Dynamics stemmed from a number of factors:
The first of these is the degree of commonness.
A high degree of commonness will initially provide a 
larger number of identical parts ... and a future higher 
rate of common maintenance and operating spares. Gen­
eral Dynamics has a distinct edge in this area and more 
closely adheres to the Secretary of Defense guidelines 
wto reduce weapons system costs by maximizing similar­
ities of Air Force and Navy versions andrby maximum 
■ use of common equipment and structures.
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Accordingly, commonality was a measure of the degree of structural 
deviation between one version of the TFX for the Air Force and another 
version for the Navy. The General Dynamics* distinct edge in commonness 
was summed up in terms of the percentage of identical parts in its design, 
83.8$ compared to 60.kfo in Boeing*s proposal.
. McNamara analyzed the commonality figures and determined that the 
General Dynamics design had the higher degree of identical parts and 
structure.
However, a March 196? General Accounting Office examination into 
the procedures ana controls that were established by the Defense Depart­
ment to maintain control of the commonality between the Air Force and 
Navy versions of the TFX aircraft, showed that:
The contractor /"’General DynamicsJ7has been includ­
ing many insignificant parts, such as bolts, nuts, rivets, 
sealants and wiring, in its commonality computation.
For example, approximately 30 per cent of the items being 
compared for commonality at the time of our review were 
commercial - standard bolts, nuts and rivets. Minor 
parts such as these were counted by the contractor and 
given the same weight in computing commonality as more 
costly items... A jet engine was counted on the same 
basis as an airframe rivet.'
Boeingfs computation did not include minor1 parts such as nuts, 
bolts and rivets. The Boeing percentage was based on an 18,000 major 
part total, while the General Dynamics included a 15*059 major part 
total and a 62,000 part total including the minor items. The result of 
the inclusion of the minor parts by General Dynamics x^ as an inflated 
commonality percentage. ^
Furthermore, Comptroller Staat*s report to Representative Mahon 
pointed out that there was no available information concerning common- 
ality of group support, parts to be stocked, or training equipment for 
the F-111 aircraft.
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A follow-up study done by the GAO on the biservice logistics and
support planning for the P—111 concluded that:
the maximum economies attainable through implementing 
biservice support of the F-111 aircraft weapon system 
will not be realized unless improvements are made in 
the logistics support plans.^
In sum, these reports showed that not only were the General Dyna­
mics commonality percentages inflated beyond proportion, but they also 
showed that the much sought after cost saving was evaporating and that 
changes in the concept of commonality were necessary if the F-111 pro­
gram was to show a cost savings anywhere near the $1 billion pro-
10jeeted by Secretary McNamara in 19&3*
A concrete example of the true worth of the idea of commonality 
will be viewed in an examination of the Navy * s version of the TFX - 
the F-111B*
The Navyg s F-1113 
When the TFX contract was signed in December of 1962, the program 
goals at that time were to buy 22 Research and Development airplanes 
plus 1,70h production models for a total buy of 1,726 airplanes.
The Air Force was to receive 1,h73 production models called the F-111A. 
The Navy was scheduled to receive 231 production models of its own 
called the F-111B. The sole differentiating factor between the F-111A 
and the F-111B was to be a lower weight limit on the Navy version to 
enable it to take-off and land on an aircraft carrier. Weight is a vital 
factor in Navy planes because there is only a small margin between car­
rier operability and inoperability.
As the design of the F-111.progressed through 19 63» it became
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apparent that General Dynamics was having trouble containing the weight 
factor. The original weight requirement for the F-111B in September of 
1962 was 38,80k pounds. By November of 1963* the weight had increased 
to *+0,284 pounds.^ Then on December 17* 1963, the Investigating Sub­
committee reported that the weight of the F-111B had climbed to *+5*259
pounds. In only 26 days the aircraft weight increased by almost 5*000
f 12 pounas.
In 1964, the Navy, at the urging of Secretary McNamara,proceeded 
to make an attempt to salvage the F-111B by cutting back on the weight 
of the craft. The program had two distinct phases. The first part of 
the weight reducing program was designated SV/IP, for ,fSuper Weight Im­
provement Program”. ^  During this stage, the Navy, General Dynamics and 
Grumman, the major subcontractor, worked together to reduce the weight 
of the airframe. This stage of weight reduction proved to be ineffec­
tive and another study was begun. This new phase was entitled QWIP-III,
1 li­fer "Contractor9s Weight Improvement Program1*, because it was initi­
ated solely by the contractors, General Dynamics and Grumman.
The CWIP-III design study recommended changes.in the F-111B struc­
ture to accomplish the Navy mission by reducing unwanted weight. The 
study recommended:
Redesign the basic fuselage ‘’from scratch1’ 
by -
Eliminating the bomb bay;
Redesigning the landing gear...;
Retaining side-by-side seating and the 
cockpit arrangement but eliminating the 
escape capsule provisions;
Steeping the current windshield...;
Shortening the. fuselage as much as practical...; 
Relocating the electronics systems...;
Utilizing. Sb'XP component weight- savings where 
applicable-."^
The CWIP-III study pointed out that "it is clearly indicated that
as the SWIP savings increase, commonality suffers somewhat; when the
transition from SWIP to CWIP-III is made, this commonality suffers even
m o r e . T h e  resulting decrease in commonality with the F-111A due to the
CWIP - redesignated "Colossal Weight Improvement Program” - would have
reduced the F-111B from 80$ down to. 29$ commonality.^
The Navy, realizing the plight it was in with the F-111B, sent the
weight and performance estimates of the F-111B to the Secretary of the
Navy and to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance as well as Secretary
McNamara, recommending that the F-111B program be stopped. This recom-
18mendation was rejected at the Secretarial level.
Secretary McNamara’s insistence on the importance of commonality 
and of the superior design characteristic apparently had the cogency to 
irrevocably commit the Pentagon to the TFX design with its collateral 
commonality.. The Navy program foundered beneath the increase weight and. 
the decreased commonality until congressional action in 1968 refused to. 
authorize funds for further production of the F-111B.
The results of the Navy * s TFX program are an impressive array of 
dubious achievements:
(1j It failed to produce a useful aircraft.
(2) It wasted over $3?8 million, in research and development 
costs over and above the R&D expenditures on the F-111A.
(3) It set back the Navy’s fighter development by six years.^9 
With the cancellation of the F-111B program, the concept of common­
ality was virtually abandoned. In the wake of the sinking F-111B, sever­
al other versions of the F-11t succumbed. The British. F-111K was can­
celled in 1968 due to rising costs. The reconnaissance versions, the
RF-111A and RF-111D, were likewise cancelled after an expenditure of 
over $118 million. The Australian F-111C has been deferred indefin- 
it ely„
In toto, the concept of commonality cost the American government 
over $523 million in research and development of an aircraft that was 
virtually inoperable.
Necessity of Commonality 
Commonality was justified on the basis of cost and cost alone. 
Secretary McNamara said that commonality would reduce the cost of devel­
opment, procurement and operation of the new aircr a f t M o n e y  would be 
saved because inter-service duplication of aircraft would be eliminated. 
Commonality was necessary because it would reduce cost and end duplica­
tion.
The question, of course, is,was it really' necessary? Certainly 
no one will argue that cost savings are not to be desired. Since savings 
never materia3-ized from the use of commonality in the TFX, it is easy 
to argue that duplication is a necessary adjunct in aircraft procure­
ment. This, of course, cannot be proven, but what is interesting to 
note is the fact that the TFX or F-111 was a duplication of existing 
aircraft, with certain advantages, but a duplication nonetheless®
That is to say, the end result of the TFX program is a supersonic 
deep interdiction bomber and not an air-to-air fighter. It was designed 
to replace the F-^ fighter, but, in fact, it merely duplicates the 
Navy’s A-6 subsonic interdict ion bomber. The point was made clear in 
an exchange between Air-Force Brigadier General Alfred L. Esposito, the .■ 
program director for the F-111 project, and Senator John McClellan and
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his general council, Mr. Jerome S. Alderman, before the Subcommittee 
on Investigations concerning the use of the F-111 in Vietnam:
Gen. Esposito - I should point out that the aircraft 
was selected because it was the only 
aircraft available that could do 
all-weather, night missions with the . 
kind of delivery accuracies that were 
needed...
Mr. Alderman - General Esposito, isn't it true that 
the Navy A-o has been doing the same 
mission since 1965?...
Gen. Esposito - It Is doing an all-weather mission, 
yes, sir.
Mr. Alderman - And that -is a subsonic plane ?
Gen. Esposito - Yes, sir.
Mr. Alderman - It was designed to be a subsonic plane?
Gen. Esposito - Correct, sir.
Mr. Alderman - The F-111 was designed as a supersonic
plane but was used in a subsonic mission?
Gen. Esposito - The conventional mission is a subsonic 
mission.
Sen. McClellan - How could you say...you had no other
planes to do the mission? The A-6 had 
been doing it all the time. "
Mr. John Brick, the chief investigator for the Subcommittee, also 
stated that "the A-6 is just as good as the F-111. It is not as fast, 
but it is less costly - the A-6 *in fact, has the same avionics equipment 
as the E-Ill."22
Thus, Secretary McNamara's emphasis on commonality produced a plane 
that fulfilled the mission of an already existing Navy aircraft, yet 
was unable to meet the standards required of the fighter aircraft it 
was designed to replace.
Finally, one must certainly question the logic of a strategyythat 
necessitates the use of commonality, when this commonality is applicable 
to less than one-sixth of the planes to be produced, or only 200 Navy 




One of the most novel procurement innovations during the McNamara 
years at the Defense Department was the introduction of what the civilian 
analysts called--"program definition phase" or PDP. Program definition 
phase or as it was later called GDP for "contractor definition phase®- 
the-name changed, but the process remained the same - was an attempt 
to insure the Pentagon against an overcommitment of funds to a weapons 
program before it was fully defined. Program definition forced the com­
peting aerodynamics firms.to fully define the purpose and possibilities 
of each new project before the Pentagon could order large scale devel­
opment of the system.
PDP was designed by the "Whiz Kids" to yield more reliable and 
more realistic estimates about the cost, time, and quality of the de­
velopment process. Its basic goal was to reduce the costs of a new 
weapon system by eliminating the tendency of competing companies to 
"buy into” a procurement program.^ Specifically, in complex weapons 
systems, such as missiles and aircraft, a decision is reached fairly 
early in the contracting process on whether the contractors bidding 
for the new system should compete by actually building- a prototype plane
or missile, or produce only a set of estimates, called "brochuremanship"
Obor buying into the contract. That is, a firm enters its brochure of 
estimates on the system, but deliberatley underestimates its develop­
ment cost in an effort at winning the contract.
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In the case of the TFX, all but two of the competitors were elim­
inated early and the remaining two firms, General Dynamics and Boeing, 
were assigned the task of carrying out the rest of the competition on 
paper.
Thus, the selection of a prime contractor for the TFX was based on 
paper analyses and wind tunnel testing of models, in an effort at avoid­
ing the cost of producing two prototype planes for the competition.
Albeit the program definition phase was employed to reduce costs, 
it has been shown that the PDP requires enormous investments in manpower, 
.money and facilities. Martin Meyerson, in a study done in 196 7 » showed 
that in the program definition phase "companies always seem to spend 
significantly more money during this phase than the contract value re­
ceived..." and that "at the peak of activity it takes about half as 
many men to implement contract definition as does the actual develop­
ment of hardware."27 Translated into figures, this means that the man­
power range for a major system contract definition would be between 
500 and 2,000 men and would■require about seven years and 90$ of the 
value of the development program. While on the other hand, a major 
weapon system without contract definition averages only years and 
96 men at about of the value of the development program. 28
The Comptroller Genera], of the U . S. Elmer Staats, after review­
ing the effects of the TFX program definition stage, concluded that:
The competition on the basis of "paper design 
studies" for the F-111 program appears to have con­
tributed to the development of cost estimates, by 
both the contractor and the Air Force, which exper­
ience shows were not realistic...efforts to achieve 
these requirements have added to the cost and other­
wise affect the program...We expressed the opinion 
that 'improvements in the quality and completeness 
of preliminary planning, including prototyping,
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would include the knowledge which would contri­
bute substantially to the accuracy of initial 
cost estimates.29
Before turning to a consideration of the full implications of non- 
prototype competition,I would like to briefly examine the TFX contract 
which made it possible.
The TFX Contract
During the decades of the 19^0*s and 1950es, the government, op­
erating in an atmosphere of emergency due to the pressures of World War II 
and the Cold War, chose to attract weapons producers through the utiliza­
tion of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract « CPFF. Under this type of 
arrangement the. government guarantees the contracting firm a. fixed pro­
fit above the total cost of the development program, or the target cost.
■ The McNamara analysts felt that contractual incentives, for cost 
reduction and cost realism were at a minimum under the CPFF arrangement 
because the target cost was not binding on the seller since the govern­
ment agreed. to reimburse the contracting firm for all costs incurred by 
them in the process of fulfilling the contract.
The Pentagon civilians under Secretary McNamara reasoned that the 
simplest way to insure cost efficiency and cost realism was to utilize 
a fixed price contract for a specific quantity of a specifically defined 
product. This arrangement, they felt, would redistribute the risks more 
equally between the government and the producing contractor. The new 
TFX contra.ct was- called a fixed-price-incentive-fee contract - FPIF.
Under the. FPIF contract, the seller would estimate its total costs in­
cluding in tills total his target profit.,, or the profit it expected to 
make. The government would then set an upper limit to the price the 
Department of Defense would pay the firm to develop the new weapon.
This governmental limit was the ceiling price and was expressed as a 
percent of the target or total costs. Any costs above that would be 
borne completely by the contracting firm. A n y  overruns between the 
contractor's target cost and the government's ceiling price would be
negotiated on a sharing formula.
The fixed-price-incentive-fee research and development contract
for the-TFX contained a 90/10 sharing arrangement — . 90$ shared by the
Pentagon, 10$ by the contractor —  a 9$ target profit and a ceiling
price of 120$ of the target cost.38
The FPIF production contract called for a much more complicated
sharing arrangement formula. According to the terms of the contract,
the sharing was to be 75/25 under target cost and 75/25 over target cost
for the first That is, if the aircraft were built at a cost under
the target cost, the government would take 75$ of the savings incurred
and the.contracting company would get the other 25$ of the savings as
well as its target profit. The same arrangement would obtain if the
costs were above target costs, the government would pay 75$ and the firm
would pay the rest.
Beyond 10?$» the sharing formula was 85/15 to the ceiling price
of 130$ of target cost, with the government again sharing the largest
o i
portion of the formula.J -
The research and development contract as well as the production- 
contract both contained terms and conditions which obligated the con­
tractor to develop, for a fixed price an aircraft meeting certain stated 
performance characteristics or, in the event of failure to do so, it 
would suffer certain penalties, reductions in price, or even termination 
for 'default. However, both of the contracts contained clauses that
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precluded making acceptance of the airplane by the Pentagon contingent
upon the aircraft’s meeting the performance requirements. These facts
were brought to light in an exchange between Senator McClelland and
Mr. John Walsh, investigator for the Subcommittee on Investigations:
Walsh - The production contract goes on 
to say...that:
"In the event that the specifications 
incorporated herein require revisions as 
a result of actions taken under provisions 
of paragraph 3»**such specification re­
visions shall be accomplished and the 
contractor shall comply therewith, at no 
change in the target cost, target price 
or ceiling price."
The words would appear to prevent General . 
Dynamics from terminating the production 
contract because of performance deficiency.. 
Once General Dynamics is in an overrun 
condition, the Government pays all costs.
Sen. McClellan - In other words', General Dynamics is insu­
lated from any loss? _
Walsh - That would be my conclusion, Senator.
Recapitulating, it would appear that in absence of well-defined 
performance standards, the government * s right to impose penalties was 
considerably weakened, the, sharing formula, was meaningless and the stated 
goal of cost efficiency was reduced to mere verbiage, as is attested 
to by the cost figures recorded in Chapter II of this study.
Consideration will now be given to the lessons learned from the 
TFX contract.
The Future of Non-Prototype Competition 
Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert was opposed to a prototype 
competition between Boeing and General Dynamics because he felt that 
prototyping the TFX would be too"costly - around' $800 million - as well 
as time-consuming - about three years worth of research and develop­
ment and several more years before the integration of the weapon
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system into our national d e f e n s e .
The issue of prototype versus non-prototype competition became 
a heated one when the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations, 
Senator McClellan, suggested that prototype: competition was more economic­
al and time-saving'than' Secretary Zuckert-'s approach of "paper airplanes.
Senator. McClellan buttressed his remarks by quoting from a RAND 
Corporation report entitled "The Role of Prototypes in Development."^
The RAND study examined twenty-two weapon system programs over a ten 
year period of time which had .utilized both the development-procurement 
approach of non-prototyping and the prototype approach. The RAND Corpor­
ation outlined three significant advantages to .prototype development:
(1) The prototype approach allows a given sum of 
money to be used on more programs.and cover a 
greater range of contingencies —  that is, there 
are a variety of prototype aircraft under devel­
opment which gives a hedge against strategic un­
certainty.
(2.) Prototyping provides' a: hedge;a.gainst technological 
uncertainty. By having several alternative air­
craft to perform a given mission means that there 
is a higher probability of achieving the desired 
capability.
(3) Even when there is only a sing3.e prototype aircraft 
funded, the prototype approach proraises a more 
efficient and relatively economical method of 
determining what is being bought.3°
The RAND report concludes from their analysis that:
We have found no statistical support for 
the hypothesis that development programs invol­
ving large initial commitments have cost less 
than prototype programs.
We have found no statistic support for the 
hypothesis that development-production programs 
have resulted in substantially reduced development 
.times.. .V7e have attempted to examine and compare 
the advantages of two' approaches to' development: 
the development-production and the expedited 
prototype methods. We have been unable to find 
consistent support for the advantages claimed 
for the first method, whereas, the second seems
to offer substantial practical advantages,.3?.
A short time after the publishing of the RAND Report « February, 
1963 - the Defense Department started to show an increased interest in 
a return to multiple prototype aircraft. On April 22, 19&3* Dr- John H- 
McLucas, the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for 
Tactical 'Warfare, stated that "the RAND Report shows that the prototype 
.method avoids freezing design and weapon options early in t h e  p r o g r a m . "^8
However, it was not until July of 19&9 that the idea finally took 
hold in Washington, D.C. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Sub­
committee on Antitrust and Monopoly, the Comptroller General Elmer Staats 
explained that .the GAO was recommending selective prototyping for these 
reasons;
(1) Better performance* price and delivery because:
(2) Physical hardware can be tested before going 
ahead with production;
(3) Cost overruns will diminish because contractors 
will have visible products on which to base 
their costs;
(1) The Defense Department m i l  be able to back off 
from doubtful design concepts before heavy in­
vestments are sunk in them.39
Finally, in the 1970 Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on 
military procurement for 19'? 1 » Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated 
that under his tenure the emphasis on Pentagon procurement will be "on 
actual prototyping and hardware test rather than paper evaluation, JTpro- 
totyping_7~sh°u-"Ld result in better adherence to cost and schedule plans. M 
Laird also stated that in an effort to avoid the pitfalls and inflexi­
bility of the McNamara procurement concept, the Pentagon "will employ 
cost-plus-incehtive-fee'type'contracts’” as well as prototyping in the
Zi 1
development of the new advanced manned strategic bomber, the B-1.
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SUMMARY
The civilian analysts on Secretary McNamara’s staff, following 
his directive to reduce costs in weapon system procurement, developed 
the concept of commonality to eliminate duplication of aircraft by the 
various branches of the service.
The TFX is the pristine example of commonality in development, 
an airplane designed for both the Air Force and the Navy, utilizing the 
same airframe, parts and logistics. Commonality became so important to 
the McNamara'team, that it was used as one of the two main justifica­
tions for the selection of General Dynamics as the prime contractor, 
since their design offered Z^ fo more commonality than the Boeing proposal.
Government Accounting Office investigations uncovered the fact 
that the General Dynamics Corporation’s computation of commonality was 
greatly inflated and the cost savings of such a design was not to be had. 
The results of their efforts at commonality was the expenditure of over 
$523 million on an airplane that was later to be cancelled by the United 
States Congress as an unworkable and far too costly a weapon, an historic 
first-in American procurement spending. The death of the Navy’s F-111B 
also signaled the decline and cancellation of several other versions 
of the so-called"versatile F-111”.
McNamara’s concept of commonality failed to produce a x^orkable 
aircraft for the Navy, who were to receive only 200 of the proposed 
1700 models to be produced. The excessive costs of the Navy version
- 81-
hampered the development of the Air Force version as well, forcing the 
Air Force to cut their purchase of the F-111 from 1500 to only 500*
The benefits of such a strategy are incomprehensible and certainly 
lead one to question the logic of a process that so heavily emphasized 
the less appreciable component of the TFX ratio, the Navy’s F-111B.
The introduction of "program definition phase" or PDP into the 
procurement of the TFX appears to have contributed greatly to the in­
creases in the cost of the TFX program, rather than in their reduction 
as planned by the "Whiz Kids",
Another procurement innovation utilized by the civilian analysts 
to reduce costs was the fixed-price-incentive-fee .contract*■'.Unfortunately., 
the ill-defined nature of the FPIF contract reduced the effectiveness 
of the reward versus penalty incentives of the agreement and, in the 
end, had no significant effect on the reduction of development costs*
In point of fact, the Department of Defense has. completely scrapped the 
idea of non-prototype competition and FPIF contracts and has reverted 
to its original practice of employing CPIF contracts and prototype com­
petition as the basic tenants of its procurement policy.
How useful has the TFX been to the various branches of the ser­
vice for which it was designed?
We can say with certainty that the bi-service commonality approach 
of the TFX has been a total failure. The Navy project was- cancelled, 
the Air Force version reduced to a third of its original total, and at 
the present time, both the Navy and Air Force are developing fighter air­
craft, independently of each other, to perform the mission that the F-111 
could not provide for them.
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What will be the rules for the future in terms - of weapon system 
procurement ?
For the immediate future, it appears as though the Department 
of Defense will require three essential elements in any new procure­
ment agreement:
(1) Independent service development of-systems;
(2 ) fully tested prototype development;
(3 ) and a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for both 
the research/development, as well as for the 
production stage of the program.
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSION
I think that the evidence available enables us to draw several 
well-founded conclusions.
One, there can be no doubt about the fact that the TFX program 
has been unable to meet the specifications and requirements for which 
it was designed. Its size and weight have so severely affected its 
dash capability and maneuverability, that its mission role has been 
reduced from that of a tactical fighter-bomber to the mere role of 
all-weather interdiction bombing - a mission that is better accomplished 
by the less costly A-6 aircraft.
Two, it is quite apparent that the TFX program has failed to pro­
duce the much vaunted $1 billion savings for which it was intended. In 
fact, the cost overruns for the research and development phase of the 
program total more than $1.6 billion, while the production overruns have 
been so great as to raise the unit price of each aircraft from the orig­
inally estimated $2 .9 million to almost $17 million per plane.
Three, there was an apparent lack of cooperation between the civil­
ian administrators in the Pentagon and their military advisers. The re­
sult of this non^cooperation was the selection of a weapon system by the 
civilians that was unacceptable to the military professionals. The re­
sulting clash of interests produced a lowering of confidence and trust 
between’the civilian and military echelons in the Pentagon and in the 
end, the outright rejection of the TFX by the military.
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Four, part of the reason for the deterioration of relations 
between the civilian analysts and the military professionals was the 
use of esoteric theories and arbitrary decisions by the civilian 
administrators, and the wholesale disregard shown by the civilians for 
the advice and expertise of the professional military officers concern­
ing the procurement process.
Five, the utilization of such procurement innovations as "common­
ality” and "program definition phase” by the civilian analyst proved 
to be ineffective in containing development costs. At the same time, 
these innovations not only failed to contain costs, but they, in fact, 
proved to be the source of much of the cost overrun and led to the 
cancellation of the Navy TFX.program, as well as to the reduction of 
the Air Force version to only a token force of aircraft.
Six, the direct result of the TFX failure is the repudiation of 
the new management techniques of Robert McNamara and his "Whiz Kids" 
and the return to the original procurement practice of. independent 
weapon development among the services and the utilization of full proto­
type development and the cost-plus-incentive-fee contract.
Consequently, I believe that the evidence is substantial enough 
to allow me to accept my hypothesis and assert that the TFX is a failure 
and that part of the responsibility for this failure can be laid on the 
civilian analyst*s inability to fit the requirements of the TFX weapon 
system into the parameters of the McNamara management technique of 
economic analysis over military experience in procurement decision- 
making.
There a r e o f  course, certain important variables that should 
have been considered , but were not, for one reason or another. Variables
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such as the role of the President in the decision-making process, 
the economic plight of General Dynamics and its role in national secur­
ity, the electoral vote factor of Texas versus Kansas, and the effects 
of the personal interests of Korth and Gilpatric in the TFX. All of 
these factors could have proven vital to this study. Since that infor­
mation was not available, however, it was not considered. Thus, what 
is lacking in the analysis of my hypothesis is also lacking in my 
conclusion. The conclusions of this study are only as valid as the 
factors examined, and although there are several variables missing, the 
conclusion, I believe, is the best possible for the information availa­
ble .
The lessons of this study are threefold. First, the TFX program 
clearly points up the necessity of military professionals. One cannot 
say with complete assurance that had the civilian administrators lis­
tened to the advice of the military, the' outcome of the TFX program 
would have been, more successful. Nevertheless, one can say with certain­
ty, that the expertise of the military in military matters is a desir­
able thing to. have available, and that the disregard for such experi­
ence cannot be justified. As Marshall Dimock has stated:
without the professional military mind... 
the U. S. would"be like a farmer using a 
horse-drawn plow when tractors are avail-
.able.*
Second, when a man reaches the highest level of administration, 
such as the Secretary of Defense, he must develop the acumen and skill 
in the use of strategy that distinguish the successful businessman or' 
politician. He must acquire an understanding of all facets of program 
administration, including the political. What is required.for the
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smooth functioning of a national policy, is an administrator capable 
of gaining the support of his superiors, his colleagues and subordi­
nates, his supporting pressure groups, and his legislative committees 
in Congress, or his program will falter.2 At the center of this effort 
is an affirmation of the political process which alone can be productive 
of policy. In short, the executive public administrator must be a 
political man, in the purest sense, that is, one capable of bargaining, 
negotiating and compromise.
Third, the TFX amply demonstrates the limits of the McNamara 
approach to weapons procurement. McNamara®s analytical approach towards 
making decisions led him to the choice between Boeing or General Dynamics 
for the source of the TFX. It enabled him to consider the alternatives' - 
and to weigh the effectiveness of each alternative; yet when it came : 
to making the actual decision , intuition, hunches or rough judgements 
were still the necessary ingredients.^
The final truth is that there are no infallible tools that will 
guarantee the correct decisions.
In the end, Secretary McNamara’s own words sum up the reality of
military procurement as he was wont to view it:
There are many factors which cannot be ade­
quately quantified and. which therefore must 
be supplemented, with judgement seasoned by
experience. 5
Unfortunately, in the TFX case, the decision of Secretary of 
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AIR FORCE PLANS-F-111A SPECIFIED PERFORMANCE VERSUS ACTUAL CAPACITY
Specification Actual Deficiency
Performance Performance (percent)
Takeoff weight........... .... .69,1221 lbs.... 82,500 20
Maximum speed, high altitude....2 .5 mach..... 2 .2 12
Maximum soeed, sea level...... .1.2 mach...... 1.2 0
Cruise Speed, high altitude.... .2 .2 mach...... 2 .2 0
Combat ceiling................ .62,300 ft.... 58,000 7
Acceleration tirae,M=.9 to M=2.2 .1.45 rain..... 4.0 275
Takeoff distance.............. .2,?80 ft..... 3.550 28
Landing distance............... .2,250 ft...... 2,320 3
Supersonic dash distance....... .210 mi....... 30 85
Ferry range............. ..... .4,180 mi...... 2.750 34
 ^Over requirement
Source: TFX Hearings - Second Series, Vol. 1, p. 59-
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A Description of the F-111 Series Aircraft
F-1T1A : The basic airplane, a tactical fighter able to operate from 
"austere15 runways, and carry a warload of almost 30,000 pounds of bombs 
on underwing pylons, plus up t o '3.000 pounds in the fuselage bay, or 
a nuclear weapon. Max TO weight: 93,000 pounds, with a single nuclear 
weapon and two externally-stowed Sidewinders. F-111s usually carry, in 
addition, a belly-mounted 20mm Gatling-tvpe cannon with 2,000 rounds 
of ammunition , and can handle Walleye guided bombs and Falcon Air-to- 
Air Missiles. Production aircraft are equipped with TF30-P-3 afterburning 
turbofans of about 22,000 pounds thrust-a 20-percent improvement (with 
a 10-percent drop in fuel consumption) over the TF30-P-1s of the re­
search aircraft. The Air Force order is now not expected to exceed 235»
RF-111A: Similar to the F-111A with reconnaissance equipment; R&D air­
craft for the mors advanced RF-111D.
F-111B : Air-superiority fighter intended to carry six 1,000-pound Hughes 
Phoenix Air-to-Air’Missiles.- In spite of a ‘'Super Height Improvement 
Program (SV/IP),” the aircraft has been plagued by overweight and excess 
drag, which reduced its required radius of action by 50 percent. The 
Navy was extremely dissatisfied with the aircraft, and required impor­
tant modifications; these were effected, but in July, ' 1.968 D0D ended 
the program after the Senate refused to vote $460 million for the pur­
chase of 30 aircraft in addition to the six already delivered for a
total R&D cost of $212.5 million.
FB-111: McNamara *s choice over the Air Force supported AMSA (Advanced 
Manned Stategic Bomber) project, for interim replacement of 455 B-58s' 
and. B-52s to be phased out of SAC by 1970; a strategic bomber version 
of the F-111 combining the F-111A-type fuselage with the extended wing 
tips and TF30-P-12 engines of the F-111B, plus the Mark 2B avionics 
system, for a full overload weight of about 100,000 pounds with a 41 ,250-
pound warload. The prototype first flew on July 30. 1967.
F-111C: The Australian version; based on a quoted price of $5*2 million 
per airplane, including ground-support equipment, training and a year9s 
supply of spares, Australia ordered 24 F-111s in 1963 as Canberra re­
placements, accepting an open-ended contract, The cost of the 24 air­
craft has since risen to $12.3 million per airplane, or, in all, about 
a quarter of the country's entire 1968-69 defense budget. The price is 
likely to continue rising, but cancellation of the contract would cost 
Australia about $225®6 million in penalies. The F-111C is outwardly 
identical to the FB-111, but uses the earlier Mark 1 avionics.
F-111D ; F-111A with the Mark 2 advanced avionics system due in late 
summer of 1969* An RF-111D prototype, scheduled to go into productinn 
in 1971* first flew in December, 1967. Of its multi-million unit cost, 
$2 .2 million is avionics and sensors.
F-111 £: Incorporated extensive intake modifications on one hundred 
sixtieth and subsequent aircraft to remove restrictions imposed by 
compressor stall at high angles of attack, high speeds (above Mach 2.2)
-105-
and high altitudes; more advanced avionics*
F-111F: New high thrust P-1Q0 engine with a 35$ increase in power over 
the original P-3 engine. The F-11TF is scheduled for delivery in the 
fall of « These F-111Fs will be a modern, high-performance, long- 
range, all-weather attack airplane with the new low cost avionics, 
good bomb-carrying capacity, and flight performance equal to the F-105 
and F-^ class in speed, acceleration and rate of climb.
F-111K: F-111A-type fuselage and wings, improved FB-111 undercarriage, 
Mark 2K avionics and RAF mission equipment for long-range strike/re­
connaissance duties;50 were ordered by the UK to replace the British- 
designed TSR-2 scrapped by the Labor government in 19^5• The order was 
cancelled in February, 1968, at a cost of $130 million in penalties, 
in the face of U. S. refusal to quote an overall cost for the order, 
and British estimates of a final cost of $?.^ million per airplane.
Source: !5The people vs. the F-111,” an article by John Fricker in 
■Flying Magazine* May, 1969, p. 1?. Reprint.





REASONS ron COST CUQUTO
AS* REPOTTED _ III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
SELECT ED -ACQU IS IT. I OH -RE PCl'iT FOR THE F-111 SYSTEMS
i . AS AT DECEMBER 31, 1969
(millions of dollars) 
F-lll
A/C/D/E/F FD-111A. Total








Impact of schedule/production rate changes 
Avionics Configuration changes 
F-11ID (Mark II)
Mark 11 support 
Change to Mark IX components 
F-111D/F configuration changes 
Subtotal 
Penetretion aids aclditiona 
Engine deyelopment/propulsion
Xngine/propulsion improvements 
M O O ’engine ’development 
Subtotal
Impact of F-111B and F-X11K cancellations " 
Southeast Asia Deployment
Systems testing *  ...   .....
Expanded flight test




Super Weight Improvement Program
Miscellaneous changes
Facilities expansion. (General Dynamics)
Crash position indicator/recorder 
Wing box and other correction of deficiencies 
not Included in other categories 
Depot AGE
Flight to mission simulator .'
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^•December 81 SARf© .program cost totals indicated cost--growth of 
$3,8X3 million, csxeXuGiva of .construction"cost of $22*7 million. 
However, the Air Force's coot variance analysis shown in the 
B M  accounted for $8^SX5 million*
(UNCLASSIFIED)
Source; Statement of Comptroller Genera 1 of the United St at ts 
"before "the Permanent Subcommittee on Iny estigations 











1. Mr. Paul Kamerik, Assistant Council, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations.
2. Mr. John Brick, Investigator, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
3. Mr. Leon F. Hartley, Supervisor, Defense Division, Government
Accounting Office.
4. Professor Leonard Rapping, Professor of Industrial Management,
Carnegie-Mellon University.
Interviews were sought with members of the General Dynamics Corpor­
ation team that work on the TFX, as well as with members of the Department 




June ?, 1961 
August 22, 1961
September 1, 1961 
October 1, 1961 
December 6 , 1961 - 
January 19. 1962 - 
January 24, 1962 -
January 30, 1962 - 
April 1, 1962
May 14, 1962
June 1, 1962 
June 14, 1962 
June 20-21, 1962 -
June 29. 1962
CHRONOLOGY
• Tactical Air Command and NASA agree on program 
for TFX.
■ Director of Research and Development orders holdup 
on source selection pending review by Secretary of 
Defense.
McNamara concludes TFX should fulfill requirements 
of only Air Force and Navy.
. Air Force and Navy report to McNamara that they are 
unable to reach agreement over joint requirements of 
TFX.
- McNamara unilaterally sets requirements for Air 
Force and Navy on TFX.
Air Force issues request to airframe industry for 
proposal and work statement.
Airframe companies, submit their proposals to Source 
Selection Board.
Source Selection Board votes unanimously to recommend 
Boeing as winner of TFX contract.
Air Force Council rejects Source Selection Board's 
decision and recommends 8-week extended competition 
between Boeing and General Dynamics-Grumman.
McNamara memo to North and Zuckert to discuss TFX \ 
with President Kennedy.
Boeing and General Dynamics submit second proposals 
to Source Selection Board.
Source Selection Board (May 14) and Air Force Council 
(May 24) recommend award to Boeing, but Navy refuses 
to go along.
Korth and; Zuckert.reject -.decision and order third 3~ 
week competition between Boeing and General Dynamics.
Boeing and General Dynamics submit third proposal 
to Source Selection Board*
Source Selection Board and Air Force Council again 
recommend award of TFX contract to Boeing, but Navy 
again refuses to go along.
Sec. Zuckert*s final runoff between Boeing and General
September 10, 1962 
November 2, 1962
November 13? 1962 




February 26, 1963 
October 16, 1964 
December 22, 1964 
January 6, 1965 
March 16, 1965
December 10, 1965 
1966
August 25» 1966 
January 21, 196? 
February 18, 196 7
Dynamics on basis of open ®pay-off points."
- Boeing and General Dynamics submit fourth pro­
posal to Source Selection Board.
- Source Selection Board (Nov. 2) and Air Force 
Council (Nov. 8) recommend contract award to 
Boeing.
- President Kennedy informed that General Dynamics 
will get contract.
« Zuckert, Gilpratric and McNamara decide tentatively 
to award contract to General Dynamics.
- Pentagon publicly announces award of TFX develop­
ment contract to General Dynamics, production of
1,726 airplanes is planned.
- Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations informs 
Secretary of the Air Force and Secretary of the 
Navy that it is making an investigation into cir­
cumstances leading to selection of General Dynamics 
proposal on TFX upon the request of Sen. Jackson 
of Washington for an investigation on Dec. 4, 1962.
» Research and Development contract signed by Air 
Force and General Dynamics at Wright-Patterson AFB, 
Dayton, Ohio, even though Subcommittee requested 
they wait.
- Senate Subcommittee opens hearings on TFX.
o TFX unveiled at Fort Worth, Texas.
- F-111 makes first flight.
- F-111 test flight canceled.
- Department of Defense confirms technical troubles 
of F-111.
* McNamara and Johnson agree on new FB-111 bomber.
■» Product and testing of F-111 at Forth Worth.
. McNamara takes charge of F-111 "Project Icarus".
- F-111A crashes during test flight.
-Second F-111A crashes during test flight.
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February 19* 196? 
April 22, 1967 
May 10, 1967
October 17* 19o7 
October 20, 196? 
November 4, 1967
January 3* 1968 
March 26, 1968 
March 29, 1968
March 31# 1968 
April 1, 1968 
April 13, 1968
April 24, 1968 
May 19* 1968 
May 22, 1963 
June 15# 1968
July 3* 1968
July 11, 1968 
August 18, 1968 
September 12, 1968 
September 23* 1968
- Third F-111A crashes during test flight.
- F-111B crashes during test flight.
- Department of Defense signs $1.82 billion contract 
on F-111; Sen. McClellan says costs will be doubled.
- First F—111A arrives at Nellis Base, Nevada.
- F-111A crashes in test flight.
- U. S. Navy Admiral Moore requests cancelation of 
F-111B for Navy.
- F-111A crashes on training flight.
- F-111A on first combat mission in Vietnam.
- First F-111A missing in action in North Vietnam;
Senate Armed. Services Committee votes to terminate 
F-111B program.
- Second F-111A shot down in Vietnam action.
- All F-111's grounded.
- F-111?s resume combat mission after correction of 
malfunction.
- Third P-111A crashes in Thailand.
-F-111 crash lands at Holloman Air Force Base.
- USAF grounds F-111 for repairs.
- A few F-111's released for flight after replace­
ment of parts.
- House Armed Services Committee votes to terminate 
F-111B program.
- Department of Defense cancels F-111B program.
- F-111 crashes.
- F-111 crashes.
- USAF grounds F-111 for second time after 11th crash 
since March.
October 8, 1968 Sen. Symington urges cancellatin of F-111 program.
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December 23, 1969 
January 14, 1970
March 5, 1970 
March 15# 1970
March 25* 1970 
December 19, 1970
March 25, 1971
- Great Britain pays $60 million to cancel order 
of 50 F-111's.
- F-111 crashes at night.
- Second F-111 crash in less than three weeks and 
13th since January, 1967.
- Sec. of Defense Laird reports F-111 costs have 
risen by $407.5 million since February, 1966.
- F-111 grounded for third time due to heat duct 
leak.
- New weaknesses found in F-111 wing structure, 
overhaul will cost $80 million.
- F-111 grounded for fourth time after 15th crash.
-Department of Defense cuts purchases of F-111 for 
1971„72 by at least $1 billion and cuts future 
orders as well.
- USAF to keep all 232 of its F-11.1's' grounded until 
new tests are given at cost of $20 million.
- Sen. McClellan reports new Subcommittee hearings 
on F-111 to establish that original costs of F-111 
have grown some 400^ and will seek to place respon­
sibility for the problems of development of the air­
craft. Department of Defense reduces production 
from 668 to 54? planes.
- Subcommittee opens hearing on TFX.
- Subcommittee report submitted by Sen. McClellan charges 
F-111 program is "fiscal blunder of worst magnitude"- 
charges Secretary McNamara with repeated errors and 
deliberate attempts to conceal the truth.
- USAF announces that it has reduced total purchases 
of F-111*s to 514 aircraft.
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